Shortly after the conclusion of the NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, earlier this month, I attended a gathering at a friend’s house outside Washington, DC. When I entered the dining room, my friends were drinking beer and munching on steamed crab, and one of them yelled, “There you are!” And he asked me, “Can you explain to me what President Erdoğan did in Vilnius?” I quickly turned and left the room. It was Sunday, and I had been answering questions about Turkey and the NATO summit for weeks.
It’s easy to see why people are confused by what Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his government want. Ahead of the summit, the Turkish leader told US President Joe Biden that Turkey’s efforts to join the European Union had been dormant for a long time before Erdogan agreed to Sweden’s efforts to join the Atlantic Alliance. He said he needed a statement of support from NATO allies. This came after a year of negotiations in which democratic Sweden amended the law in accordance with non-democratic Turkey’s wishes to secure Erdoğan’s support.
The Turkish government’s request came as a surprise to almost everyone, including Biden, but shortly after arriving in Vilnius, the Turks surprised everyone again by announcing their support for Sweden’s NATO membership, along with European Council President Charles Michel. tweeted He said he and Erdogan had met and “explored opportunities” to “bring cooperation back to the forefront and reinvigorate relations” between the EU and Turkey.
But Erdogan was not finished. Almost at the end of the summit, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) foreign policy spokesperson said: away Comments from Sweden’s member states suggest that Turkey did not actually agree with what everyone believed. In any case, Sweden’s member states will have to wait until the Turkish Grand National Assembly convenes in October.
To the casual observer, all this zigzag before, during, and after the NATO summit seems perplexing and perhaps indicative of a mercurial leader or a chaotic foreign policy. Ta. But in reality, throughout the Erdoğan era, Turkey has consistently pursued three fundamental foreign policy ideals: strategic independence, power, and prosperity.
This is not at all surprising; after all, these are traits that nearly any country would like. But given all the changes Erdogan has made during his two decades in power, it was hard to see a strategy in what seemed like purely domestic politics-driven contradictions. But strip away the details of the four phases of Turkish foreign policy under Erdogan, and it becomes clear that the leader knows where he wants to take Turkey; he’s just experimenting with the best ways to get there.
Since the AKP came to power in November 2002, there have been four overlapping phases in Turkish foreign policy, starting with a focus on EU membership. After that, Turkey distanced itself from Europe and positioned itself as a major power in the Middle East. However, after making a bold effort to lead the region, Turkey’s strategic position fundamentally changed in 2013. As a result, tensions persisted between Turkey and other Middle Eastern powers for nearly a decade, during which Erdoğan and the AKP represented Turkey as the only principled actor. A region that pursues democracy and stability. This, in turn, led to the latest phase of regional rapprochement and deliberate rebalancing between the United States and Russia.
In the first stage, Erdoğan and the AKP sought to achieve their goals through EU membership. While there is intense debate among analysts as to whether President Erdoğan and his party were serious about Turkey’s membership, it is hard to imagine how membership would strengthen Turkey’s prosperity, power, and independence. do not have.
Prosperity generally comes with EU membership, which is why so many Turks supported the AKP’s 2003 and 2004 constitutional and legal reforms aimed at bringing Turkey into line with EU standards even before EU membership. I supported it. One need only look across the Aegean Sea to Greece to understand the economic benefits associated with EU membership. Indeed, Greece experienced a dire financial crisis in her 2010s, but still, her GDP per capita is twice that of Turkey’s. Ankara’s global power and prestige will also expand if Turkey joins one of the world’s most exclusive clubs.
When it comes to promoting Turkey’s foreign policy independence, the debate over EU membership is a little trickier. After all, membership in a bloc requires a state to sacrifice some of its sovereignty to supranational institutions. Still, joining the EU would put Turkey on equal footing with major European powers such as Britain (then a member), France and Germany, which often pursue independent foreign policies.
Turkey’s accession to the EU ended quickly due to European opposition and Turkey’s ambivalent attitude. This changed Ankara’s pursuit of independence, power, and prosperity.
President Erdoğan and the AKP were already interested in playing a major role in the Middle East, but they became more active after 2005, when the prospects for EU membership faded. Ankara has positioned itself as a regional troubleshooter, problem solver, and truth teller, especially regarding Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip. This phase of Turkish foreign policy culminated in April 2012, when then Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu told parliamentarians: This will create prosperity around Türkiye. ”
For a while, Erdoğan succeeded. Turkey and the Turkish president himself were popular in the region, especially as the Turkish government became closely associated with the Palestinian cause. The foreign policy community in Washington has been buzzing with talk of the so-called Turkish model, which demonstrated that Islamist accumulation of political power can be matched with democracy and economic development. Establishes a partnership between Turkey’s Development Agency and the United States to help promote the prosperity that officials and analysts believe is essential to building more just, open, and democratic societies in the Arab world There was even discussion about doing so. The partnership was important because regional experts believed Ankara had prestige in the Middle East that Ankara had squandered long ago.
But shortly after Mr. Davutoglu’s appearance in the Grand National Assembly, Turkey suffered a series of setbacks in the region. Turks told their American interlocutors that they had special insight into the region thanks to cultural affinities brought about by their shared religion and Ottoman heritage, but they overstated the mood. I read it wrong. Even though much of the Arab world admired Erdoğan and the AKP, they did not want Turkey to become the master or leader of the Arab Middle East.
Then, in early July 2013, Egyptian troops toppled Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi after a tumultuous year in office. Erdogan and the AKP had invested heavily in Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood organisation, and were infuriated by Saudi Arabia’s and the United Arab Emirates’ encouragement, and the US’s embrace of the revolt.
As a result, new changes occurred in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey will now seek strategic independence, power, and prosperity by setting itself apart from the regions it has traditionally sought to dominate.
Turkey gave refuge to Muslim Brotherhood leaders and other Egyptian dissidents, allowing them to set up shop and weakening Egyptian strongman and coup leader Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. The Turkish government also became a patron of Libya’s internationally recognized government, which was opposed by Saudi Arabia, Egyptians, and Emirates. President Erdoğan continued to support the Palestinians, especially Hamas, but allowed Turkish authorities to carry out operations against Israel from offices in Turkey. And, of course, the Turkish government played a key role in exposing Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s responsibility in the murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi.
In all this, Erdoğan and the AKP have maintained that their foreign policy has been principled, and while this may have invited hostility from governments in the region, it has only increased their prestige among the population. It can be legitimately argued that. In doing so, President Erdoğan announced Turkey’s independence from the US-led strategic order, whose most powerful member states, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel, are on opposite sides of conflicts and disputes in the region. emphasized. Despite the deterioration of relations between the Turkish government and some of the most important countries in the Middle East, trade remained strong with some countries, including in particular Israel and Egypt.
However, by 2021, the limits of Turkey’s approach to the Middle East were becoming clear. Even if it increases the country’s prestige and Ankara’s own sense of its rightful place as a Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, and Muslim power.
A coalition of Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Israel, France, the UAE and Saudi Arabia has united to oppose Turkey’s use of power. Part of this countervailing effort took place in the form of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, led by Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel. In many ways, this forum was an ad hoc multilateral security coordination disguised as economic cooperation. To be sure, the region has a lot of gas to develop and there are incentives for regional cooperation to bring it to market, but the Saudi Air Force, the United Arab Emirates, the Israeli Air Force and the Greek Air Force are together in the skies of the Mediterranean. I couldn’t help but notice that he was doing some exercises. The navy patrolled the waters near Cyprus.
Isolated and plagued by a self-inflicted currency crisis, President Erdoğan has come to grips with new changes in Turkey’s foreign policy. He said conflict with the Middle East was no longer worth the cost and that friendly relations with Saudi Arabia, Emiratis, Israelis and Egyptians could bring in investment from the Persian Gulf and improve relations with Washington. It was determined that there was.
President Erdoğan may have changed tack on the Middle East, but he has remained consistent in his approach toward Russia, which also stems from his desire to establish Turkey’s independence and enhance Turkey’s prestige. In late February 2022, after Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the entry of troops into Ukraine, President Erdoğan said the right things about supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and sold important military equipment to Kiev, but Turkey The government did not allow Russian air attacks to destroy bilateral relations with Moscow.
This helped Turkey negotiate the Black Sea Grains Agreement between Russia and Ukraine, and also aided Ankara’s efforts to reverse the economic damage caused by President Erdoğan’s unorthodox economic affairs. The Turkish government never accepted Western sanctions against Moscow, instead allowing Turkish companies to enter and replace Western companies that left, allowing Russian oligarchs to obtain Turkish residency and Approved to invest in Turkey.
All this brings us back to Vilnius. Serious observers of Turkey knew there would be plenty of Turkey-related drama in the lead-up to the NATO summit. The summit is a major opportunity for Erdoğan to pursue his long-term plan to establish Turkey’s independence and power.
President Erdoğan (and his opponents) do not want Turkey to be treated simply as a security asset for Europe’s southeast. If President Erdoğan can sustain NATO expansion longer, extract a commitment from Mr. Biden to provide Turkey with new F-16s, and persuade EU leaders to resume cooperation with Turkey, the Customs Union agreement could be strengthened. There is a possibility that it will lead to, and it will be praised at that time. As politicians, Turkey’s leaders could legitimately declare “mission accomplished” after agreeing to Sweden’s membership in NATO. And that’s exactly what he did.
