1
Based on expert interviews conducted by the author.
2
Based on World Bank data, measured in US dollars (constant 2015), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY. GDP.MKTP.KD?locations=TR. Note that GDP growth was not linear during this period. All links accessed immediately before publication unless otherwise stated.
3
See İbrahim Kalın, “Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework, Values, and Mechanisms”, International Journal (winter 2011–12): 7–21 (10). Hakan Fidan, “A Work in Progress: The New Turkish Foreign Policy”, Middle East Policy 20, no. 1 (2013): 91–96.
4
On this: Kemal Kirişçi, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State”, New Perspectives on Turkey 40 (spring 2009): 29–56.
5
Kalın, “Turkish Foreign Policy” (see note 3), 9.
6
Ibid., 13.
7
On this: Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007”, Insight Turkey 10, no.1 (2008): 77–96.
8
Kalın, “Turkish Foreign Policy” (see note 3), 12.
9
Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Political Transformation of the Islamic World: Periodization and Projection” (Turkish), Divan 1 (2002). Davutoğlu resigned from the AKP in 2019 and founded the Future Party (Gelecek Partisi).
10
Based on a closed reading of Davutoğlu’s scholarly publications, Behlül Özkan argues that the intellectual underpinnings of his mental map could best be described as pan-Islamist. Behlül Özkan, “Turkey, Davutoğlu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 56, no. 4 (2014): 119–40.
11
World Bank, Turkey: Exports, by Country and Region, 2020 https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/TUR/ Year/2020/TradeFlow/Export. World Bank figures match the data released by the Turkish Statistics Institute, TÜİK.
12
Ibid.
13
As listed on the Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade website, https://www.trade.gov.tr/free-trade-agreements.
14
Data compiled by the author from TÜİK statistics. Available at https://data.TUİK.gov.tr/Kategori/GetKategori?p=dis-ticaret-104&dil=1.
15
TOBB-BIS, “Industry for Peace Initiative: Conceptual Framework” (Turkish), (Ankara: Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey [TEPAV], 2006), https://www.tepav.org. tr/upload/files/1269865515r7447.TOBB_BIS_Baris_icin_Sanayi_Girisimi.pdf.
16
“Industry for Peace Initiative Is Frozen” (Turkish), Habertürk, 1 January 2009, https://www.haberturk.com/ekonomi/ makro-ekonomi/haber/118464-baris-icin-sanayi-projesi-askiya-alindi.
17
“Palestine Leases Land to Turkey” (Turkish), Milliyet, 18 March 2010, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/ekonomi/filistin-Türkiyeye-toprak-veriyor-1213078.
18
“The Economic Outlook of Palestine” (Turkish), Website of the Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, https://www. mfa.gov.tr/filistin-ekonomisi.tr.mfa.
19
On this: Cihan Tugal, “Towards the End of a Dream? The Erdoğan-Gulen Fallout and Islamic Liberalism’s Descent”, Jadaliyya, 22 December 2013, https://www.jadaliyya. com/Details/29981.
20
Taken from the website of DEIK, https://www.deik. org.tr/kurumsal-hakkimizda.
21
On this: Marie Vannetzel and Dilek Yankaya, “Crafting a Business Umma? Transnational Networks of ‘Islamic Businessmen’ after the Arab Spring”, Mediterranean Politics 24, no. 3 (2019): 290–310.
22
“Activities in Africa” (Turkish), Cerceve 63 (Istanbul: MÜSİAD, January 2014), 52, https://www.musiad.org.tr/ uploads/yayinlar/cerceve-dergileri/pdf/cerceve63.pdf.
23
Nadine Marroushi, “Senior Brotherhood Member Launches Egyptian Business Association”, Egypt Independent, 26 March 2012, https://egyptindependent.com/senior-brother hood-member-launches-egyptian-business-association/.
24
World Bank, Turkey Exports (see note 11).
25
“Public Views of the U.S.-China Competiton in Mena”, Arab Barometer VII, July 2022, https://www.arabbarometer. org/wp-content/uploads/ABVII_US-China_Report-EN.pdf.
26
Based on interviews conducted by the author. See also: Marwa Rashad, “Saudi Retail Chains Join Growing Informal Boycott of Turkish Products”, Reuters, 19 October 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-turkey-trade-idUSKBN2741XF.
27
Arab Barometer VII, Palestine Report, 2022, https://www. arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/Arab-Barometer-VII_Palestine-Report-2021-2022.pdf.
28
The proportion declined from 81 per cent to 62 per cent between 2018 and 2022. See Arab Barometer VII, Jordan Report: https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABVII_ Jordan_Report-EN.pdf (51).
29
Arab Barometer VII, Morocco Report: https://www.arab barometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABVII_Morocco_Report-ENG.pdf.
30
Amir Tavakoli and Şevket Can Tülümen, “Construction Industry in Turkey”, Construction Management and Economics 8, no. 1 (1990): 77–87; Heyecan Giritli et al., “International Contracting: A Turkish Perspective”, Construction Management and Economics 8, no. 4 (1990): 415–30. Cited from John Calabrese, “Building in Africa: Turkey’s ‘Third Way’ in China’s Shadow”, Middle East Institute, 21 June 2022, https://www. mei.edu/publications/building-africa-turkeys-third-way-chinas-shadow#_ftn4 (accessed 23 July 2023).
31
“Turkish International Contracting Services (1972–2021)”, Turkish Contractors Association, https://www.tmb.org.tr/files/ doc/1623914018902-ydmh-en.pdf.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
34
Calabrese, “Building in Africa” (see note 30).
35
Data compiled by the author from the statistics available on the website of the Turkish Statistics Institute (TÜİK), https://data.TUİK.gov.tr/Kategori/GetKategori?p=egitim-kultur-spor-ve-turizm-105&dil=1.
36
The proportion of visitors from Russia, Ukraine, the southern Caucasus and Central Asia also increased considerably during the same period, from 13 per cent to 22 per cent.
37
Compiled by the author from tourism income expenditure data available on the website of TÜİK, https://data.TUİK. gov.tr/Kategori/GetKategori?p=egitim-kultur-spor-ve-turizm-105&dil=1.
38
Based on expert interviews conducted by the author.
39
From the UNHCR website, https://bit.ly/3VhSrb5.
40
“Number of Syrians in Turkey July 2023”, Mülteciler Dernegi, 22 August 2023, https://bit.ly/3wTYZmt.
41
Killian Cogan, “The Perfect Balance between Islam and Modernity: Istanbul, Home to the New Arab World?” Le Monde Diplomatique, June 2021, https://mondediplo.com/ 2021/06/07istanbul. Also see M. Hakan Yavuz, Erdoğan’s Soft Power Arm: Mapping the Muslim Brotherhood’s Networks of Influence in Turkey, Center for Research and Intercommunication Knowledge Special Reports 187/2020 (Riyad: Center for Research and Intercommunication Knowledge, 2020), https:// crik.sa/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Erdoğans-Soft-Power-Arm.pdf.
42
Ayşe Serdar, “An Illiberal Inclusion? The AKP’s Politics of Exceptional Citizenship”, Turkish Studies 24, no. 1 (2023): 51–74.
43
The website of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Investment Office, Guide to Foreign Citizens’ Acquisition of Turkish Citizenship, https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/library/ publications/lists/investpublications/guide-to-foreign-citizens-acquisition-of-turkish-citizenship.pdf. According to the latest available data from the Ministry of Environment and Urban Affairs, 19,630 foreigners acquired Turkish citizenship between 2018 and 2021 on the basis of real estate investments.
44
The website of the TÜIK, https://data.TUİK.gov.tr/ Kategori/GetKategori?p=insaat-ve-konut-116&dil=1.
45
The website of the TÜIK. See also Cameron Deggin, “Seven Reasons Arabs Are Investing in Turkey”, Property Turkey, https://www.propertyturkey.com/blog-turkey/seven-reasons-arabs-are-investing-in-turkey.
46
Compiled by the author from housing sale statistics issued by TUİK. Russian buyers rank first since the war in Ukraine.
47
Based on UNESCO data, http://data.uis.unesco.org.
48
Kerim Ülker, “Turkey Plays a Big Role in Defense” (Turkish), Dünya, 25 July 2023, https://www.dunya.com/kose-yazisi/Türkiye-savunmada-buyuk-oynuyor/699344.
49
Markus Bayer, Global Militarisation Index 2021 (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies, 2021), https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/ 83191/ssoar-2021-bayer-Global_Militarisation_Index_ 2021.pdf? sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
50
Sinem Adar, “Understanding Turkey’s Increasingly Militaristic Foreign Policy”, APSA Mena Politics Newsletter 3, no. 1 (spring 2020): 10–13 (12), https://apsamena.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/apsa-mena-politics-newsletter-spring-2020-final.pdf.
51
Bahadır Özgür, “From Koç to Sancar: Turkey’s War Machine” (Turkish), Gazete Duvar, 23 February 2021, https:// ww.gazeteduvar.com.tr/koctan-sancaka-Türkiyenin-savas-makinasi-makale-1514116.
52
On this: Federico Donelli, UAVs and Beyond: Security and Defence Sector at the Core of Turkey’s Strategy in Africa, Megatrends Africa Policy Brief (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2022), https://www.megatrends-afrika.de/ assets/afrika/publications/policybrief/MTA_PB02_2022_ Donelli_UAVs_and_beyond.pdf; Nebahat Tanrıverdi Yaşar and Hürcan Aslı Aksoy, Making Sense of Turkey’s Cautious Reaction to Power Shifts in Tunisia, SWP Comment 52/2021 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2021), doi: 10.18449/ 2021C52; Murat Yeşiltaş, “Deciphering Turkey’s Assertive Military and Defense Strategy: Objectives, Pillars, and Implications”, Insight Turkey 22, no. 3 (2020): 89–114.
53
Adar, “Understanding Turkey’s Increasingly Militaristic Foreign Policy” (see note 50).
54
Jack Dutton, “From Ukraine to Libya. Why Are Turkey’s Baykar Drones so Popular?”, Al-Monitor, 23 July 2023, https:// www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/07/ukraine-libya-why-are-turkeys-baykar-drones-so-popular.
55
Jack Dutton, “Saudi Arabia Agrees to Produce Turkey’s Baykar Drones”, Al-Monitor, 7 August 2023, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/08/saudi-arabia-agrees-produce-turkeys-baykar-drones.
56
“Turkey Agrees to Provide Drones to Egypt”, Reuters, 4 February 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-agrees-provide-drones-egypt-2024-02-04/.
57
Based on expert interviews conducted by the author.
58
Ayşe Zarakol, “Turkey’s Democratic Resilience”, Project Syndicate, 11 May 2023, https://www.project-syndicate.org/ commentary/turkish-election-shows-opposition-dedication-to-democracy-by-ayse-zarakol-2023-05. Gönül Tol and Ali Yaycıoğlu, “Yes, Erdoğan’s Rule Might Actually End This Weekend”, Foreign Policy, 9 May 2023, https://foreignpolicy. com/2023/05/09/turkey-election-Erdoğan-kilicdaroglu-akp-nation-alliance/.
59
A coalition government of ideologically different parties is not new. What is new is the formation of an informal coalition before the elections. This is an imperative of the presidential system, given that no political party alone can expect to exceed 50.1 per cent of the vote.
60
Kerem Öktem, “ The Limits to Autocratisation or Autocratisation without Limits? Turkey and the May 2023 Elections” (German), Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 63, no. 3–4 (2023): 31–42. On the opposition alliance: Berk Esen, The Opposition Alliance in Turkey: A Viable Alternative to Erdoğan? SWP Comment 52/2022 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2022), doi: 10.18449/2022C52v02.
61
Hürcan Aslı Aksoy and Salim Çevik, Is Extensive Election Fraud Possible in Turkey’s Fiercest Elections, SWP Point of View (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 10 May 2023), https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/is-extensive-election-fraud-possible-in-turkeys-fiercest-elections.
62
“How have we voted since 1920!” (Turkish), Bianet, 20 May 2015, https://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/164654-1920-den-bugune-nasil-sectik-secemedik.
63
Sinem Adar and Yektan Türkyılmaz, “Turkey: Post-election Brawl – A Regime at a Crossroads”, Open Democracy, 30 April 2019, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/turkey-the-post-election-brawl-a-regime-at-a-crossroads/.
64
“Erdoğan Changes 4 Provincial Borders ‘as Part of Gerrymandering’”, Duvar English, 21 March 2021, https://www. duvarenglish.com/Erdoğan-changes-4-provincial-borders-as-part-of-gerrymandering-news-56724.
65
Berk Esen and Şebnem Gümüşçü, “How Erdoğan’s Populism Won Again”, Journal of Democracy 34, no. 3 (2023): 21–32.
66
Yunus Sözen, “Popular Will against Democracy: Populist Autocratization in Turkey”, Reflektif: Journal of Social Sciences 1, no.1 (2020): 9–29.
67
“The Global State of Democracy 2022: Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent”, Global State of Democracy Initiative, 2022, 11, https://www.idea.int/publications/ catalogue/global-state-of-democracy-2022.
68
“Egypt’s Sisi Wins 97 Percent in Election with No Real Opposition”, Reuters, 2 April 2018, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-egypt-election-result-idUSKCN1H916A.
69
Sarah Yerkes and Maha Alhomoud, “One Year Later, Tunisia’s President Has Reversed Nearly a Decade of Democratic Gains” (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 22 July 2022), https://carnegie endowment.org/2022/07/22/one-year-later-tunisia-s-president-has-reversed-nearly-decade-of-democratic-gains-pub-87555. Note that the power capture in Tunisia was viewed mostly positively by citizens as an attempt “to break the political deadlock more than a political coup”. See Arab Barometer VII, Tunisia Report, 2022, 2, https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/AB7-Tunisia-Report-EN.pdf.
70
Arab Barometer VII, Iraq Report, 2022, 2, https://www. arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABVII_Iraq_ Country_Report-ENG.pdf.
71
On this: Eva Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring”, Comparative Politics 44, no. 2 (2012): 127–49; F. Gregory Gause III, “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian Stability”, Foreign Affairs 90, no. 4 (2011): 81–84; Marc Lynch, “After Egypt: The Limits and Promise of Online Challenges to the Authoritarian Arab State”, Perspective on Politics 9, no. 2 (2011): 301–10.
72
Arab Opinion Index 2022 Executive Summary (Washington D.C.: Arab Center, 2022), https://arabcenterdc.org/wp-content/ uploads/2023/01/Arab-Opinion-Index-2022-Executive-Summary.pdf.
73
In the immediate aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which ushered in a new era of political and economic liberalisation, international cooperation and connectedness, the so-called Turkish model became a point of reference for the newly independent Central Asian Republics’ integration into the West. On this: Andrew Mango, “The Turkish Model”, Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 4 (1993): 726–57. The United States was a strong promoter of the Turkish model, and the idea was certainly well-received by the Turkish political elites who were anxious not to lose the country’s strategic leverage in a world which was no longer bipolar. See Dov Friedman, The Turkish Model: The History of a Misleading Idea (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 25 August 2015), https://www.americanprogress.org/ article/the-turkish-model/. Friedman argues that the idea of Turkey being a model is not limited to the post–Cold War era and was in fact evident at the beginning of the Cold War when the then president, Ismet Inonu, presented Turkey “as a Middle East state firmly allied against Soviet communism and eager to facilitate Western diplomacy in a volatile region”.
74
Note that even before the 2000s, the Turkish government promoted Turkish Islam as a moderate variant, and it was considered easy to work with, particularly in Europe. It is no coincidence that many European countries with Turkish labour migrants outsourced religious services to the Turkish state institution, Diyanet. This was due to two factors: relatively well-functioning relations between Turkey and its Western allies during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath and the perception that Turkish Islam was moderate compared to its counterparts. On this: Zana Çitak, “Between ‘Turkish Islam’ and ‘French Islam’: The Role of the Diyanet in the Conseil Français du Culte Musluman”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36, no. 4 (2010): 619–34; Sinem Adar, Rethinking Political Attitudes of Migrants from Turkey and Their Germany-Born Children: Beyond Loyalty and Democratic Culture, SWP Research Paper 7/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2019), doi: 10.18449/2019RP07.
75
Christopher de Bellaigue, “Welcome to Demokrasi: How Erdoğan Got More Popular Than Ever”, Guardian, 30 August 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/30/wel come-to-demokrasi-how-Erdoğan-got-more-popular-than-ever.
76
“Speech delivered by H. E. Ali Babacan, Foreign Minister of Turkey, the Atlantic Council, Global Leadership Speaker Series, 3 June 2008”, website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-delivered-by-h_e_-ali-babacan_-foreign-minister-of-turkey_-the-atlantic-council_ global-leadership-speaker-series_-3-june-2008.en.mfa.
77
Mustafa Akyol, “What Makes Turkish Islam Unique?”, in Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: An Unusual Candidacy, ed. Constantine Arvanitopoulos (Berlin: Springer Link, 2009), 183–93.
78
Ammer Fayed, “Factors Determining Egyptian Policy towards Turkey after 2014”, Al Sharq Forum, 10 September 2021, https://research.sharqforum.org/2021/09/10/egyptian-policy-towards-turkey/.
79
Friedman, “The Turkish Model” (see note 73).
80
Taken from Soli Özel and Gencer Özkan, “Do New Democracies Support Democracy: Turkey’s Dilemmas”, Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011): 124–38 (137).
81
“A Muslim Democracy in Action”, Economist, 17 February 2011, https://www.economist.com/europe/2011/02/17/a-muslim-democracy-in-action.
82
Friedman, “The Turkish Model” (see note 73).
83
Şebnem Gümüşçü, “Turkey’s Reactions to the Arab Spring”, Yale Journal of International Affairs, 16 May 2012, https://www.yalejournal.org/publications/turkeys-reactions-to-the-arab-spring.
84
Daniela Huber, Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy: Identity, Interests in US, EU and non-Western Democracies (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 157.
85
Cengiz Çandar, “Talking Syria…” (Turkish), Hürriyet, 7 July 2012, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/suriye-konusmak-20934333.
86
Fidan, “A Work in Progress” (see note 3).
87
Şaban Kardaş, “Turkey and the Arab Spring: Coming to Terms with Democracy Promotion”, German Marshall Funds Policy Program (October 2011).
88
Özel and Özkan, “Do New Democracies Support Democracy” (see note 80), 134. For a critical analysis of how Ankara’s foreign policy promotion changed from cooperative during the first half of the 2000s to confrontational after the Arab uprisings, see Huber, Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy (see note 84).
89
Hend El-Behary, “Turkey’s Soft Power Threatened after MBC Bans Turkish Dramas”, Egypt Independent, 7 March 2018, https://egyptindependent.com/turkeys-soft-power-threatened-after-mbc-bans-turkish-dramas/.
90
Shahira Amin, “Dar al-Ifta Joins in Egypt-Turkey Culture War”, Al-Monitor, 16 February 2020, https://www.al-monitor. com/originals/2020/02/dar-al-ifta-joins-in-turkish-egyptian-culture-war.html.
91
“Internet Watchdog Bans Access to the Independent’s Turkish Website”, Duvar English, 19 April 2020, https://www. duvarenglish.com/media/2020/04/19/internet-watchdog-bans-access-to-the-independents-turkish-website.
92
Yousef al Otaiba, “A Vision for a Moderate, Modern Muslim World”, Foreign Policy, 2 December 2015, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/02/a-vision-for-a-moderate-modern-muslim-world-uae-abu-dhabi-isis/.
93
Youssef Sheiko, “The United Arab Emirates: Turkey’s New Rival” (Washington Institute, 16 February 2018), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/united-arab-emirates-turkeys-new-rival.
94
“The UAE and Saudi Arabia Are Present in Northeast Syria” (Turkish), Yeni Safak, 20 November 2018, https:// www.yenisafak.com/dunya/bae-suudfiratin-dogusunda-3409878.
95
“Saudi and Greek Air Forces Begin Joint Exercises in Greece”, Arab News, 18 March 2021, https://www.arabnews. com/node/1826716/saudi-arabia.
96
“Greece Signs Deal to Provide Saudi Arabia with Patriot Air Defence System”, Reuters, 20 April 2021, https://www. reuters.com/world/middle-east/greece-signs-deal-provide-saudi-arabia-with-patriot-air-defence-system-2021-04-20/.
97
Cinzia Bianco, “Understanding the Emirati-Greek Relationship” (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 27 January 2021), https://www.mei.edu/publications/understanding-emirati-greek-relationship.
98
Mohanad Hage Ali, “Exiles on the Bosphorus”, Diwan (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Middle East Center, 10 March 2020), https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/81249. Also see Abdelrahman Ayyash, Amr Elafifi and Noha Ezzat, Broken Bonds: The Existential Crisis of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, 2013–22 (Washington, D.C.: Century Foundation, 2023).
99
Abdelrahman Ayyash, The Turkish Future of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, (Washington, D.C.: The Century Foundation, 2020), https://tcf.org/content/report/turkish-future-egypts-muslim-brotherhood/.
100
Ibid.
101
“Qaradawi: Thanks to Turkey and to the President Erdoğan”, website of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, 23 April 2016, https://www.iumsonline.org/en/Content Details.aspx?ID=6176.
102
Musab Turan, “De-dollarization Campaign by Arabs living in Turkey” (Turkish]), Anadolu Agency, 15 August 2018, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/turkiyede-yasayan-araplardan-dolar-bozdurma-kampanyasi/1232197.
103
“The Union of Arab Communities Announces ‘Thank you Türkiye’ Festival” (Arabic), Anadolu Agency, 2 February 2020, https://bit.ly/49RPlz5.
104
Murat Sofuoglu, “How Arabs Perceive Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East”, TRT World, 2020, https://www. trtworld.com/magazine/how-arabs-perceive-turkey-s-foreign-policy-in-the-middle-east-40415.
105
Killian Cogan, “Istanbul, Home to the New Arab World”, Le Monde Diplomatique, June 2021, https://monde diplo.com/2021/06/07istanbul.
106
Özel and Özkan, “Do New Democracies Support Democracy” (see note 80), 127.
107
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, “Reminder to Netanyahu”, Twitter [X], 15 May 2018, https://twitter.com/RTErdoğan/ status/996469218085429249?lang=de.
108
On this: Bulent Aras, Turkey and the Palestine Question, SETA Policy Brief 27 (Ankara: Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research [SETA], January 2009), https:// ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/pbei/seta/0015602/f_0015602_13607. pdf.
109
On this: Bulent Aras, “The Davutoglu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy”, Insight Turkey 11, no. 3 (2009): 127–142.
110
Nathalie Tocci, “Firm in Rhetoric, Compromising in Reality: The EU in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, Ethnopolitics 8, no. 3–4 (2009): 387–401 (399).
111
Kemal Kirisci and Rob Keane, “Turkey’s Israel-Palestine Opportunity”, National Interest, 1 August 2013, https://www. brookings.edu/articles/turkeys-israel-palestine-opportunity/.
112
“On 24 July, We Plan to Open Hagia Sophia during Friday Prayers for Religious Service” (Turkish), Euronews, 10 July 2020, https://tr.euronews.com/2020/07/10/ayasofya-n-n-cami-olarak-ac-lmas-karar-sonras-Erdoğan-ulusa-sesleniyor.
113
Muhammed Enes Calli, “Denying Existence, Rights of Palestinians Will Not Bring Peace to Israel”, Anadolu Agency, 27 October 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/ denying-existence-rights-of-palestinians-will-not-bring-peace-to-israel-turkish-foreign-minister/3034818.
114
Amberin Zaman, “Turkey’s Erdogan Hails Hamas as Liberators“, Al-Monitor, 25 October 2023, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/10/turkeys-erdogan-hails-hamas-liberators-leaving-detente-israel-shreds.
115
Aile Şurası, Youtube (Turkish), 26 October 2023, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=VkVYZM0adl4.
116
Adar, Rethinking Political Attitudes of Migrants (see note 74).
117
Ibid.
118
Ibid.
119
Note that SETA stopped publishing the report in 2021, when one of the authors parted ways with the organisation.
120
Hulya Corakci Ertan, “We Should Unite in Our Response to Islamophobia” (Turkish), Anadolu Agency, 14 April 2016, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/basbakan-davutoglu-islamofobiye-karsi-ortak-tavirda-bulusmaliyiz/554974. Ibrahim Kalin, “Islamophobia Will Not Solve Europe or Asia’s Problems”, Al Jazeera, 15 June 2019, https://www. aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/6/15/islamophobia-will-not-solve-europe-or-asias-problems.
121
Aamir Latif, “Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia Unite to Fight Islamophobia”, Anadolu Agency, 26 September 2019, https://bit.ly/3IWB5JP.
122
Zeliha Eliaçık, “Turkey Is the Leading Actor in the Global Fight against Islamophobia” (Turkish), Anadolu Ajansi (15 June 2021), https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/islamofobi-ile-kuresel-mucadelede-oncu-rol-turkiyenin/2274321.
123
Ibid.
124
The website of the UN, https://documents.un.org/doc/ undoc/gen/n22/288/70/pdf/n2228870.pdf?token=3SZ1T2uwzlBiKR1pTw&fe=true.
125
İbrahim Kalın, X (formerly Twitter), 5 October 2020, https://twitter.com/ikalin1/status/1313067636880801793.
126
On this: “Analysis: France’s Never-ending Battle with Islam”, TRT World, 2020, https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/ analysis-france-s-never-ending-battle-with-islam-34498. Abdulaziz Ahmet Yaşar, “France’s Islamophobia and Its Roots in French Colonialism”, TRT World, 2019, https://www. trtworld.com/magazine/france-s-islamophobia-and-its-roots-in-french-colonialism-25678.
127
“Turkey Says France’s Macron Endangers EU Interests, Playing Colonial Games”, TRT World, 10 September 2020, https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/turkey-says-france-s-macron-endangers-eu-interests-playing-colonial-games-39653.
128
“After Russia and France, Turkey Has Also Joined the Debate on Africa: Critical Remarks at Macron” (Turkish), Haber Global, August 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=7Ah6JYcELN0.
129
“The Local Population Will not Accept the Presence of the Ex-colonizer States Such as France and the UK” (Turkish), SETA, 24 December 2018, https://www.setav.org/fransa-ve-ingiltere-gibi-eski-somurgeci-devletleri-bolge-halki-uzun-vadede-kabullenemez/.
130
President Erdoğan Addresses the UN General Assembly, The website of Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı, 24 September 2014, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/3255/ president-erdogan-addresses-the-un-general-assembly.
131
“Available in Three Languages: ‘The World Is Bigger Than Five’” (Turkish), A Haber, 12 November 2017, https:// www.ahaber.com.tr/gundem/2017/11/12/3-dilde-dunya-5ten-buyuktur.
132
“Erdoğan’s Motto ‘The World Is Bigger Than Five’ Is in School Textbooks”, Birgün, 8 December 2018, available online at: https://www.birgun.net/haber/Erdoğan-in-dunya-5-ten-buyuktur-sozu-ders-kitabina-girdi-239497.
133
Deniz Dede, “The Search for a World Order without ‘Spoiled Behavior’: A More Just World Is Possible” (Turkish), Kriter 6, no. 61 (October 2021), https://kriterdergi.com/ kitaplik/kaprissiz-bir-duzen-arayisi-daha-adil-bir-dunya-mumkun.
134
“Speech delivered by the Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan at the 14th annual meeting of the Turkish ambassadors” (Turkish), the website of the Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 7 August 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-hakan-fidan-in-14-buyukelciler-konferansi-acilisinda-yaptigi-konusma–7-agustos-2023.tr.mfa.
135
Diyar Guldogan, “Shame International Community”, Anadolu Agency, 24 January 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/ en/turkiye/shame-international-community-still-unable-to-stop-bloodshed-in-gaza-turkish-foreign-minister/3116844.
136
On this: Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Ayşe Zarakol, “Struggles for Recognition: The Liberal International Order and the Merger of Its Discontents”, International Organization 75 (2021): 611–34. Senem Aydın-Düzgit, “Authoritarian middle powers and the liberal order: Turkey’s contestation of the EU”, International Affairs 99, no. 6 (2023): 2319–2337.
137
Sinem Adar and Halil Ibrahim Yenigun, “A Muslim Counter-Hegemony? Turkey’s Soft Power Strategies and Islamophobia”, Jadaliyya, 6 May 2019, https://www.jadaliyya. com/Details/38646/A-Muslim-Counter-Hegemony-Turkey’s-Soft-Power-Strategies-and-Islamophobia.
138
Chinese aggression against Uyghur Turks, for instance, does not receive as much criticism as Islamophobia in Europe.
139
Zeynep Gulsah Capan and Ayse Zarakol, “Postcolonial Colonialism? The Case of Turkey”, in Against International Relations Norms, ed. Charlotte Epstein (London: Routledge, 2017), 193–211 (202).
140
Ibid., 203.
141
“TRT World Forum 2018 Highlight: Ibrahim Kalin on the Resilience of the People of the Muslim World”, TRT World, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ChmlKJ_tIfo.
142
Ken Moriyasu and Sinan Tavsan, “Turkish Drone Maker Baykar Seeks to Extend Global Influence”, NikkeiAsia, 18 August 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-Spotlight/Turkish-drone-maker-Baykar-seeks-to-extend-global-influence.
143
İbrahim Kalın, A Century of Turkish Foreign Policy: Conference Proceedings (Turkish), SETA (Ankara: SETA, 26 April 2023), https://setav.org/assets/uploads/2023/05/TDP-Yuzyili-KK.pdf.
144
Also see Meliha Benli Altunışık, Turkey: Arab Perspectives, Foreign Policy Analysis Series 11 (İstanbul: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, 2010), https://www.tesev.org. tr/wp-content/uploads/report_Turkey_Arab_Perspectives.pdf.
145
Hediye Levent, “Abdurrehman Salahaddin: We Admired Secular and Modern Turkey” (Turkish), Gazete Duvar, 20 December 2021, https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/ abdurrehman-salahaddin-sekuler-modern-turkiyeye-hayrandik-makale-1546144.
146
Hakkı Taş, “Erdoğan and the Muslim Brotherhood: An Outside-in Approach to Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East”, Turkish Studies 5, no. 23 (2022): 722–42.
147
On this: Osman Bahadir Dincer, “The Legacy of the Arab Uprisings on Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Ankara’s Regional Power Delusion”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs (2022): 1–20; Mustafa Kutlay and Ziya Öniş, “Understanding Oscillations in Turkish Foreign Policy: Pathways to Unusual Middle Power Activism”, Third World Quarterly 42, no. 12 (2021): 3051–69.
148
Tanrıverdi Yaşar and Aksoy, Making Sense of Turkey’s Cautious Reaction to Power Shifts in Tunisia (see note 52). See also: “Tunisian Economy” (Turkish), The Website of the Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/ tunus-ekonomisi.tr.mfa.
149
Arab Barometer VII, Tunisia Report (see note 69).
150
Tanrıverdi Yaşar and Aksoy, Making Sense of Turkey’s Cautious Reaction to Power Shifts in Tunisia (see note 52).
151
“Morocco Threatens to Close Down Turkish Retailer amid Trade Talks”, Reuters, 11 February 2020, https://www. reuters.com/article/morocco-turkey-trade-idINL8N2AB4SR.
152
Ibid.
153
Fuat Emir Şefkatli, Saudi Arabia Casting Shadow over Morocco-Turkey Economic Relations (Ankara: Center for Middle Eastern Studies [ORSAM], November 2020), https://www. orsam.org.tr/en/saudi-arabia-casting-shadow-over-morocco-turkey-economic-relations/.
154
Rashad, “Saudi Retail Chains” (see note 26).
155
Nicholas Danforth and Aaron Stein, Turkey’s New Foreign Policy: Ankara’s Ambitions, Regional Responses, and Implications for the United States (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2023), https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/02/turkeys-new-foreign-policy-ankaras-ambitions-regional-responses-and-implications-for-the-united-states/.
156
On this: Hürcan Aslı Aksoy and Stephan Roll, A Thaw in Relations between Egypt and Turkey: Weaknesses in Foreign Policy and the Economy Bring the Regimes in Cairo and Ankara Closer Together, SWP Comment 39/2021 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2021), doi: 10.18449/2021C39; Stephan Roll, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE: The End of an Alliance, SWP Comment 47/2023 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2023), doi: 10.18449/2023C47v02.
157
“Turkey’s Shutdown of ‘Mekameleen’ Signals the End of an Era in Muslim Brotherhood Activity, Regional Policy Shift”, Arab Weekly, 3 May 2022, https://thearabweekly.com/ turkeys-shutdown-mekameleen-signals-end-era-muslim-brotherhood-activity-regional-policy-shift.
158
Ayyash et al., Broken Bonds (see note 98), 15.
159
Ayyash et al., Broken Bonds (see note 98), 111.
160
“President Erdoğan Receives IUMS Delegation”, the website of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, 8 August 2023, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/149023/president-Erdoğan-receives-iums-delegation.
161
“Statement on President Erdoğan’s Meeting with Abbas and Haniyeh”, the website of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications, 26 July 2023, https:// www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/statement-on-president-Erdoğans-meeting-with-abbas-and-haniyeh.
162
Cuma Cicek, “Opening”: Kurdish Issue and Search for Solutions (Turkish) (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2018), 193.
163
“Turkey’s Gezi Trial Verdict a Travesty of Justice”, Freedom House, 26 April 2022, https://freedomhouse.org/ article/turkeys-gezi-trial-verdict-travesty-justice/.
164
Berk Esen, What Does the Gezi Trial Tell Us about Erdoğan’s Regime in Turkey? SWP Point of View (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 9 May 2022), https://www.swp-berlin.org/ en/publication/what-does-the-gezi-trial-tell-us-about-Erdoğans-regime-in-turkey.
165
M. Şakir Saraç, “Gezi Terror Is Part of School Curriculum” (Turkish), Yeni Safak, 20 September 2018, https://www. yenisafak.com/gundem/gezi-terorumufredatta-3396797.
166
“Kuwaiti Tourist ‘Beaten Unconscious’ in Turkey’s Trabzon amid Rising Anti-Arab Racism”, The New Arab, 18 September 2023, https://www.newarab.com/news/kuwaiti-tourist-assaulted-turkey-amid-anti-arab-racism (accessed 23 September 2023).
167
Paul Benjamin Osterlund, “Killing of Refugee Highlights Struggle Facing Syrians in Turkey”, AlJazeera, 5 October 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/10/5/killing-of-refugee-highlights-struggle-facing-syrians-in-turkey.
168
Muhammed Fansa, “Bullying, “Kimlik” and Poverty Make Third of Syrian Children out of Turkey’s Schools”, Enab Baladi, 4 February 2023, https://english.enabbaladi.net/ archives/2023/02/bullying-kimlik-and-poverty-make-third-of-syrian-children-out-of-turkeys-schools/.
169
Burcu Karakas, “The Fragility of Syria Refugee Women in Turkey”, Osservatorio Balcanie Caucaso Transeuropa, 24 December 2018, https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/ Turkey/The-fragility-of-Syrian-refugee-women-in-Turkey-191805. Also see: Aysun Dogutas, “Gender Based Violence Against Syrian Refugee Women in Turkey”, Border Crossing 9, no. 2 (July–December 2019): 113–24.
170
Roberta Gatti et al. Altered Destinies: The Long-Term Effects of Rising Prices and Food Insecurity in the Middle East and North Africa (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group, 2023), https:// openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/ 8e31828f-f062-4a40-a929-fabe7d1b17cd/content.
171
Danforth and Stein, Turkey’s New Foreign Policy (see note 155), 55.
172
“Turkey and UAE Sign a Series of Investment Agreements”, Invest in Turkey 94 (2021), https://www.invest.gov. tr/en/news/newsletters/lists/investnewsletter/investment-office-dec-2021-newsletter.pdf.
173
Guido Steinberg, Regional Power United Arab Emirates: Abu Dhabi Is No Longer Saudi Arabia’s Junior Partner, SWP Research Paper 10/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 8 July 2020), doi: 10.18449/2020RP10.
174
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Saudi Reasons for a Rapprochement with Turkey (Washington, D.C.: Arab Center, 31 May 2022), https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/saudi-reasons-for-a-rapprochement-with-turkey/.
175
See also: Sinem Adar, “Turkey’s Response to the War in Gaza”, War on the Rocks, 1 November 2023, https:// warontherocks.com/2023/11/turkeys-response-to-the-war-in-gaza/.
176
Rome MED Dialogues Expert Survey: The Gaza War and Its Impact (Milan: Italian Institute for International Political Studies [ISPI], 8 February 2024), https://www.ispionline.it/ en/publication/rome-med-dialogues-expert-survey-the-gaza-war-and-its-impact-163149#g5.
177
Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications, The Joint Arab Islamic Summit Resolutions, 12 November 2023: https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/ haberler/detay/the-joint-arab-islamic-extraordinary-summit-resolutions.
178
Reuben Silverman, “Can Turkey Both Stand Up to Israel and Do Business with It?” Turkey Analyst, 12 January 2024, https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/717-can-turkey-both-stand-up-to-israel-and-do-business-with-it?.html.
179
Zehra Nur Duz and Esra Tekin, “Turkish President Reiterates Call for UN Reform after US Veto Blocking Cease-fire in Gaza”, Anadolu Agency, 9 December 2023, https:// www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkish-president-reiterates-call-for-un-reform-after-us-veto-blocking-cease-fire-in-gaza/ 3078222.
180
Michael Robbins et al., “How the Israel-Hamas War in Gaza Is Changing Arab Views”, Foreign Affairs, 14 December 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/how-israel-hamas-war-gaza-changing-arab-views.
181
Arab Public Opinion about Israel’s War on Gaza (Washington, D.C.: Arab Center, 8 February 2024), https://arabcenter dc.org/resource/arab-public-opinion-about-israels-war-on-gaza/.
182
Ibid.
183
Tobias Bunde et al., “Lose-Lose? Munich Security Report 2024”, Munich Security Conference, February 2024, https:// securityconference.org/assets/01_Bilder_Inhalte/03_Medien/ 02_Publikationen/2024/MSR_2024/MunichSecurityReport 2024_Lose-lose.pdf.
184
On this: Louise Fawvett, “The Iraq War 20 Years On: Towards a New Regional Architecture”, International Affairs 99, no. 2 (2023): 567–85; Peter Ricketts, “After Iraq: The Great Unravelling”, New Statesmen, 15 March 2023, https:// www.newstatesman.com/international-politics/geopolitics/ 2023/03/after-iraq-great-unravelling-peter-ricketts.
185
Andrea Teti, Gennaro Gervasio and Pamela Abbott, “Perceptions of the EU: Activists and Public Opinion in the Middle East”, in Routledge Handbook in EU-Middle East Relations, ed. Dimitris Bouris, Daniela Huber and Michelle Pace (London: Routledge, 2022).
186
On this: Rosemary Hollis, “No Friend of Democratization: Europe’s Role in the Genesis of the ‘Arab Spring’”, International Affairs 88, no. 1 (2012): 81–94. Assem Dandashly, “EU Democracy Promotion and the Dominance of the Security-stability Nexus”, Mediterranean Politics 23, no.1 (2018): 62–82.
187
Muriel Asseburg, Shaping the Future of Gaza: How Europe Could Contribute to Sustainable Stabilisation, SWP Comment 4/2024 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 9 February 2024, doi: 10.18449/2024C04.
188
Martin Konecny, “The EU’s Response to the Gaza War Is a Tale of Contradiction and Division”, Cairo Review of Global Affairs, (winter 2024), https://www.thecairoreview.com/ essays/the-eus-response-to-the-gaza-war-is-a-tale-of-contra diction-and-division/. See also: Daniel Levy et al., Prospects of Reinvigorating the Middle East Peace Process: A Possible Joint EU-US Undertaking?, Directorate General for External Policies Policy Department, European Parliament, (January 2023), https:// www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2022/702573/EXPO_STU(2022)702573_EN.pdf#15.
189
Moritz Rau, Günter Seufert and Kirsten Westphal, The Eastern Mediterranean as a Focus for the EU’s Energy Transition: Deep-Rooted Enmities and New Opportunities for Cooperation between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, SWP Comment 8/2022 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 10 February 2022), doi: 10.18449/2022C08.
190
Sinem Adar and Friedrich Püttmann, Making EU-Turkey Cooperation on Migration Sustainable: A Greater Focus on the Turkish Host Society is Required, SWP Comment 7/2022, (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 9 February 2022), doi: 10.18449/2022C07.
