Despite the welcome news about Sweden, the Turkey of old is not coming back, but Erdogan’s apparent shift into legacy-building mode will give Washington an opportunity to leverage its influence abroad.
On January 23, the Turkish parliament approved Sweden’s membership in NATO, paving the way for Stockholm’s eventual membership in the alliance. The Biden administration is focused on expanding NATO amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and although Sweden’s application for membership must wait for a vote in Hungary’s parliament, Turkey’s decision is a major step forward.
Previously, the Turkish government had withheld approval of Stockholm’s application for nearly two years after it was submitted in May 2022, making the issue emblematic of the deep dysfunction in U.S.-Turkish relations. This week’s parliamentary vote promises to end that era and gives both Washington and Ankara a chance to chart a new course, even as other differences remain.
President Erdoğan’s new Türkiye as a middle power
Over the past two decades, Turkey has experienced what amounted to a political revolution under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The president has created a “new Turkey” through his strong leadership and the popular quest for regional power status.
This shift is also evident in the field of foreign policy. Whereas modern-day founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his 20th-century followers promoted an exclusively European and somewhat inward-looking identity, President Erdoğan has embraced Turkey’s plurality of European, Middle Eastern, and Eurasian identities. has embraced his identity and sought a more outward-looking role. Among other things. In practical terms, this means promoting Turkey as an independent power that openly prioritizes its own interests over any alliances, formal or informal.
The Swedish problem is a good example. Stockholm’s lenient attitude toward the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Turkey’s long-time nemesis and a designated terrorist organization by NATO and U.S. authorities, comes as Turkish officials explain why they are putting the country’s NATO application on hold. was frequently cited. Meanwhile, President Erdogan maintained close political ties with President Vladimir Putin and deepened economic ties between Russia and Turkey, which have staunchly opposed NATO expansion. But Erdogan did not translate these moves into a broader strategic pivot against Russia, preferring instead to strike a (sometimes uneasy) balance between Moscow and Washington. The Turkish military and its proxies have even recorded various military successes against Russian-allied forces in Syria, Libya, and the South Caucasus, with the country having been involved in centuries of strategic competition, including It lends credence to its emergence as a reliable middle power capable of punching above its weight. Together with Russia.
Indeed, the new Turkey still considers itself part of the Western world. However, unlike in the 20th century, this identity is no longer exclusive or dualistic. The Turkish government is now free to engage with Washington, NATO, Russia, Europe, Iran, wealthy Gulf monarchies, and other regional and global actors without feeling it has to pick favorite partners. While 20th-century Turkey had deep emotional attachments to Europe, Erdogan’s Turkey loves itself more.
Leveraging Sweden’s accession
When Stockholm applied for NATO membership in 2022, Turkey took a hardline stance, forcing the Swedish government to enact and implement new counterterrorism legislation targeting the PKK and other Kurdish groups, particularly their local fundraising networks. The Biden administration agreed with some of these Turkish concerns but did not want to delay Sweden’s membership amid the growing Ukraine crisis. The U.S. government therefore encouraged Turkish and Swedish authorities to work together to address these issues swiftly.
However, Turkish government security elites were confident that if the United States continued to delay its demands on Sweden, it would make concessions. Specifically, it wanted to end the de facto embargo on U.S. arms sales to Turkey that had been in place since Ankara’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defense system in 2017. . He also wanted to end the snub from the lone Biden. No U.S. president has invited Erdogan to the White House in the two decades the Turkish leader has been in power.
So far, developments have proven these elites correct. After quickly ratifying Finland’s NATO membership, which Turkey had applied for alongside Sweden, Washington realized that Stockholm could be left in the cold indefinitely and decided to develop a strategy that would please the Turkish government. devised. Most notably, if Turkey ratifies Sweden’s bid, the White House will purchase 40 F-16 fighter jets and Congress’ holdouts on Ankara’s long-standing request to modernize 79 existing aircraft The administration has indicated that it will make efforts to lift the restrictions. U.S. officials also indicated that Erdogan’s visit to Washington could be considered.
Future path towards Sweden’s membership
The parliamentary vote indicates that for Ankara, Sweden’s membership application is on autopilot (although Hungary may try to extract concessions of its own before approving its membership). The government published its results in the Turkish Official Gazette on January 25, indicating its desire to secure a visit by Erdogan to the White House as soon as possible, ideally before Turkey’s nationwide local elections on March 31. Formalizing the process in this way was likely Ankara’s way of avoiding a scenario in which U.S. outreach to Erdogan could be seen as interference in Turkey’s local elections.
The Turkish government is then required to deposit with the US Department of State the necessary documents evidencing Turkey’s approval of Sweden’s membership (i.e., the “accession instrument”) in accordance with the NATO Charter. The department will then notify Congress of the administration’s intention to sell new F-16s and modernization kits to Turkey, which reportedly could happen as early as next week. President Erdoğan may then receive a formal invitation from President Biden to the White House.
Current status of the Self-Defense Forces issue
Recent news articles suggested that the US government may also reconsider its policy towards the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria. Since 2014, the US government has relied on the YPG, the main organization within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), to fight the Islamic State. However, since the YPG is an offshoot of the PKK, the Turkish government opposed the partnership from the beginning.
From the Turkish government’s perspective, this issue has hollowed out bilateral relations for many years. Therefore, even the suggestion that the US might reconsider its YPG policy could give Turkey enough reason to embrace a new era of relations with the US.
The contours of a new relationship?
Despite prospects for positive change, improving bilateral relations does not mean that U.S.-Turkish relations will return to factory status, but rather that the Turkish government will return to U.S. power. It’s nothing to do. The best way for U.S. officials to approach a new Turkey is to acknowledge that Turkey will neither leave nor embrace the West. Rather, President Erdoğan’s Turkey is a multi-alliance that can rest where it wants on all geopolitical issues, including the war in Ukraine, the conflict in the South Caucasus, and instability in the Middle East. This position allows the Turkish government to remain in the spotlight and avoid risks to almost any actor, even though it is part of her NATO alliance. For example, Ukraine supported Kiev militarily during the war while maintaining economic ties with Russia.
After winning the 2023 presidential election, President Erdoğan no longer faces major challenges domestically and has entered the phase of building the legacy of his career. Having revolutionized the country’s politics and rebuilt its geopolitical identity, he is positive both for Turkey (as a country with a good international standing) and for himself (as a politician rather than a divisive one). I want to leave a lasting legacy.
President Erdoğan’s apparent change presents an opportunity for the White House to engage with his new Turkey and leverage his regional and global influence in today’s era of increasing great power competition. Either way, Washington needs to accept the fact that the old Turkey will not return.
Soner Cagaptay is a Bayer Family Fellow and director of the Turkey Studies Program at the Washington Institute.
