Last month, a series of anti-Turkey protests in Sweden infuriated the Turkish government and threatened to further delay the Nordic country’s NATO membership application. The protests featured symbols of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and included a mock hanging of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan from a lamppost. To make matters worse, Rasmus Paldan, a dual Swedish-Danish citizen and leader of the Danish far-right Hardline party, burned a Quran outside the Turkish ambassador’s residence in Stockholm, explaining the act with derogatory remarks about Islam and immigrants.
Swedish authorities moved quickly to condemn the actions and distance the government from the protests, but noted that the protests did not violate Swedish law. Prime Minister Ulf Kristerson said the events were an attempt to sabotage his country’s NATO membership, as Turkey (along with Hungary) has not yet ratified Sweden’s or Finland’s NATO membership. The Swedish foreign minister added that the protests were playing into Russia’s hands. Meanwhile, former Finnish Prime Minister Alexander Stubb said: was suggested He said Russia may have been behind the Quran burning and warned about hybrid warfare tactics.
But Turkey was unfazed by these explanations, and the deliberate move to add fuel to the fire seems to have worked: Turkey immediately canceled an official visit to Ankara by the Swedish Speaker of the Parliament and Minister of Defense, while President Erdogan, already busy campaigning for hotly contested elections in just a few months, strongly criticized Sweden. Erdogan said that a lack of respect for Turkey and the Islamic faith would cost Sweden Turkish support for its NATO membership application.
Erdogan was appealing to the masses and capitalizing on the widespread anger that was generated in Turkish society. While the difference between the protests, with their racist and Islamophobic aspects, and the Swedish government’s official stance was clear to Erdogan, the benefits of garnering public support in the middle of an election season outweighed any other considerations. This sentiment was reflected in demonstrations and statements by the main opposition parties, including the main opposition party. Republican People’s Partycenter right Yeah partyand the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party.
However, the possibility that Turkey may further delay Sweden’s NATO application is problematic not only for Sweden but also for Turkey. In the context of the war in Ukraine and the resulting geopolitical paradigm shift, the image of Turkey obstructing Sweden and Finland’s historic decision to join NATO is not good. It reinforces the image of Turkey as an unreliable and disruptive player at a time when Euro-Atlantic security is being restructured.
Turkey’s supporters point out that Greece blocked North Macedonia’s NATO membership application for years, and that Athens and Skopje agreed to a negotiated solution over the country’s name, but the situation is very different today and the damage to Turkey’s image is much greater.
Turkey’s consent to Sweden and Finland starting the NATO membership process was conditional from the start. The agreement was reached in a last-minute deal brokered on the sidelines of a NATO summit in Madrid in June after Sweden and Finland committed to addressing security concerns about the activities of certain groups, including the PKK, which Turkey considers a terrorist organization along with Sweden, the United States and many other countries. Turkey also called on the two countries to end official obstruction of defense industry cooperation.
The first of these objectives is the crux of the matter. It is designed to target Sweden, where Turkey believes that anti-Turkish elements have taken refuge and continue their recruitment, propaganda and fundraising activities. Ankara’s assessment of Stockholm’s response in this regard was negative even before the recent events. Writing in a local newspaper in December, the Turkish ambassador to Sweden disputed Sweden’s claims that it had kept its promises and called for further action. Recent experiences can only strengthen this view in Ankara.
However, Sweden’s beliefs and official position are very different. Swedish authorities say they have done what is legally possible. Echoing the general sentiment of the Swedish public, they criticize Turkey for asking too much and try to garner outside support for their position. With regard to Sweden, the sticking points are mostly resolved, so the ball is in Turkey’s hands. The next logical step would be for Turkey to ratify the Swedish-Finland accession treaty. Turkey may not like that, but most of the NATO allies, except Hungary, would probably agree.
At the root of this issue is a major disconnect between Sweden and Turkey. The issue needs to be resolved, but it is not an easy one. The two sides have different interpretations of the law, and in some cases Turkish expectations do not match the reality of the Swedish governing system. Swedes often point to the independence of their country’s institutions, including the police, and the government’s inability to influence them. At the same time, Turks point out that the independence of an institution does not necessarily guarantee the fairness of its practices. (Without a NATO agreement, the Swedish government might point out that Erdogan’s Turkey is not a reliable assessor of fair democratic institutions, given Turkey’s poor record on freedom of expression and association.)
Moreover, the issue has begun to cast a shadow over Turkey’s hopes of purchasing F-16 fighter jets from the U.S. Although Ankara and Washington continue to stress that the NATO application and Turkey’s request to procure F-16s are separate issues, the connection may be taking root in the minds of U.S. lawmakers who have a say in fighter sales.
In any case, Turkey will not be in a hurry to ratify the NATO accession protocol. This is a question for after the elections in May. Meanwhile, discontent and emotions are growing on all sides. The next important milestone in NATO enlargement is the summit to be held in Vilnius, Lithuania in July. The time until then should be managed wisely by Turkey, Sweden and Finland. They should avoid pointless blame games and focus on fostering a cooling off period by finding rational ways to manage and eventually get out of this pointless impasse. It may seem impossible, but there is a way to do this.
First, Turkey, Sweden and Finland should commit to keeping their differences private. This means refraining from provocative statements and populist rhetoric. Reinforced silence should be the agreed upon position.
Turkey’s election cycle may tempt Erdogan to act differently, and it is to be expected that the Swedes and Finns will doubt the seriousness of his such a promise, especially given his reputation. However, there are encouraging precedents that continue to emerge. In contrast to the fiery rhetoric he recently adopted towards Greece, Erdogan has been silent towards Israel and Armenia, two countries he could easily target to score domestic points. This is a deliberate choice on his part, and shows that he has the ability to choose when necessary. He should do the same towards Sweden and Finland, and their NATO ambitions. Erdogan should no longer treat this situation as low-hanging fruit for domestic political points. Meanwhile, Sweden and Finland should continue to make good-faith efforts to address Ankara’s concerns.
Second, the three countries should establish mechanisms to coordinate strategic messaging as necessary and be prepared to dominate the news cycle with coordinated, and sometimes joint, messages, which would be primarily important in times of crisis.
Third, while political contacts may be frozen for now, working-level meetings between officials should be intensified. This would help build a culture of cooperation, clear away clichés, and better understand each other’s concerns and constraints. The tripartite memorandum of understanding signed by the parties in June now appears to have different interpretations that need to be addressed. Turkey should therefore retract its recent decision to cancel meetings of the tripartite mechanism designed for this purpose. Sweden has already expressed its intention to continue these talks. Now is the time for the parties to intensify efforts to build a common level of ambition in the implementation of the memorandum of understanding. Two guiding principles should be the exclusion of deviations from existing commitments and new conditions.
Finally, Turkish defense industry companies are still struggling to obtain export licenses from Sweden. Sweden must resolve this issue and conduct an honest internal evaluation of the recent incidents targeting Turkey. While Stockholm maintains its commitment to freedom of expression, Swedish authorities should consider ways to minimize provocations where possible in order to limit the damage to relations with Turkey.
Turkey has been a NATO ally for over 70 years, and has a proud tradition as a defender of NATO’s eastern flank during the Cold War, and as an ally that is a contributor rather than a consumer of Euro-Atlantic security. And Turkey has always been a strong advocate of NATO’s open door policy. On the other hand, Sweden and Finland deserve to join NATO. Both countries have traditionally had good relations with Turkey, and this relationship will acquire a new dimension of mutual interest within NATO.
The convergence of interests between Turkey, Sweden and Finland is greater than the differences they are currently trying to resolve. This is the spirit they need to move forward.
