The Palestinian issue has always been a concern of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and a rallying cry for his conservative base. The Turkish strongman has had a rocky relationship with Israel during his two decades in power, including regular sparring with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and occasional attempts to normalize relations. During that time, President Erdoğan has never shied away from publicly expressing support for Hamas, inviting Hamas leaders to Istanbul and viewing Hamas as a legitimate part of the Middle East’s political map.
After October 7, however, Erdogan made a grave miscalculation, failing to condemn the atrocities committed against Israeli civilians, and instead repeating that “Hamas is not a terrorist organization. It is a liberation movement.” Strong support for the group in such a trying time effectively froze Turkey out of hostage negotiations, regional diplomacy and the possibility of playing a larger role in post-conflict Gaza. Incensed and upset by Israel’s disregard for Palestinian civilians in its military attacks on Gaza, Erdogan has since accused Israel of “war crimes” and “genocide” while criticizing what he perceives as Western double standards and overt support for Israel.
If the Turkish president had been more cautious in his public support for Hamas, a little more diplomatic in his tone, and less willing to wholeheartedly support Hamas after October 7, Ankara would likely be at the center of international diplomacy regarding Gaza. would have been located. Erdogan could have led diplomacy around hostage negotiations and easing regional tensions, as he did with the Black Sea grain deal and the prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine. He could also find a larger global pulpit to advocate for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and draw international attention to Turkey’s proposals, including a trusteeship for a future Palestinian state. It should be.
Instead, October 7 highlighted Turkey’s diplomatic estrangement on Arab-Israeli issues, despite Erdogan’s popularity in Arab quarters. In the aftermath of the Hamas attack, Turkey was all too eager to play a role in regional diplomacy and emerge as a leader on the regional front that could isolate the Israeli government and pressure it to abandon its hardline policy in Gaza. . Instead, it has been largely ignored in hostage negotiations, and despite its ties to Hamas’ political leadership, Turkey has not emerged as a diplomatic hotspot in the Palestinian issue or efforts to avert regional escalation.
To make matters worse for Ankara, Gulf states and Egypt have joined the Turkish-led anti-Israel United Front, despite condemning Israel’s disregard for civilian lives in the Gaza Strip. The US has made it abundantly clear that it has no interest in abandoning its policy of normalizing diplomatic relations with Tellurium. Aviv.
The lukewarm relationship between the Turkish government and Washington is not an easy one for President Erdoğan. For nearly a decade, relations between Turkey and the United States, once a cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Middle East, have been volatile for nearly a decade, from Turkey’s opposition to U.S. aid to the Syrian Kurds to U.S. criticism of Turkey’s human rights record and human rights issues. It is a drama shaped by mutual dissatisfaction. Relations with Russia are rapidly growing. For many in Washington, Turkey has come to be seen as a “faithful ally.” Relations between Turkey and the United States are increasingly on the verge of marital breakdown, with deep suspicions and dissatisfaction on both sides.
The Biden administration started 2021 with a policy of distancing itself from Erdogan, initially aimed at better managing the relationship after four tumultuous years under President Donald Trump. However, the situation has hardly improved since then. There is little engagement at the leadership level between Erdoğan and Biden, and the two capitals’ strategic differences regarding the emerging world order and its various challenges are significant.
The Ukraine war has forced Washington to accept Turkey’s tightrope walk between Moscow and Kiev and turn a blind eye to Turkish-Russian trade that violates Western-led sanctions. Within NATO, there is both gratitude towards Turkey (for closing the Bosphorus to Russian warships) and dissatisfaction (for temporarily blocking Sweden’s membership application and banning trade with Russia).
Regarding the Middle East, President Erdoğan’s pro-Hamas stance has so irritated the Israeli government and public that the possibility of a Turkish role in Gaza is unrealistic, at least in the short term. For the United States, this created a new level of regional tension that needed to be managed. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken omitted Turkey from his first regional diplomatic tour since October 7, and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, furious at the US government’s clear support for Israel, announced that Blinken would refused to meet with him.
When the two sides finally met in January, on Mr. Blinken’s fourth stop, the conversation was as much about Gaza as it was about getting Turkey to ratify Sweden’s membership in NATO — an initiative that will take place in Washington this summer. This is a priority for the White House ahead of the upcoming NATO summit. Turkey finally ratified Sweden’s membership, much to the relief of Sweden and its NATO allies.
The question now is whether this is a sufficient basis for a reset of Turkish-US relations, i.e. whether the two allies can cooperate on a number of strategic issues, including European security. This period of discord has not served either side strategically, especially now that the US is trying to manage diplomacy around two major wars in Turkey’s immediate neighbourhood. In the midst of such geopolitical turmoil, both Turkey and the US need improved relations with each other. But to get there, Washington and Ankara need to manage their differences and identify common interests, especially in geo-economic terms. They also need to accept that whatever partnership emerges will be “a la carte” and very different from the perfect post-Cold War alignment.
The period of estrangement is not strategically advantageous to either side, and is especially evident at a time when the United States is trying to engage in diplomacy over two major wars, both of which are occurring right next door to Turkey.
The long-delayed approval of Sweden’s membership in NATO through Turkey’s parliament has temporarily improved relations and created a positive atmosphere within the alliance as it prepares for its 75th anniversary summit. Following Sweden’s ratification, the US Congress will approve the sale of F-16s to Turkey, something the Turkish government desperately wants.
But the real strategic conversation begins after that. Once the give-and-take is over, the two allies should sit down and discuss the future of Syria and Iraq, as well as the worsening situation in Gaza. Tightening sanctions against Ukraine, the Black Sea, Iran, and Russia are also becoming serious issues. The Biden administration is acutely aware that Turkey is so close to everything, both politically and geographically, that it is more vulnerable than it would like to admit.
All of this is related to Gaza. At some point, Turkey could play a role in Gaza reconstruction or in a multinational peacekeeping force. It is difficult to imagine the current Israeli government agreeing to Turkey’s role, but then again it is difficult to predict what will happen in the region in a year or two.
For now, Türkiye and the United States need to take small steps. We need to learn to talk again, rediscover each other and build some level of trust in order to work better together in the two wars raging on Turkey’s borders. Although this dialogue will be primarily bilateral, it could also benefit Europe and other NATO allies. European countries, in particular, could benefit from this détente by reaching out to Ankara and Turkey establishing good relations with the United States, providing vital security for Europe’s eastern neighborhood and further afield in the central region. It is possible that Japan could focus on building closer cooperation with Turkey on the above concerns. east. Therefore, Europe could also benefit from deeper economic ties with Turkey, which is a top market and production base for Europe. If Turkey succeeds in leaning toward a transatlantic partner in Ukraine and plays a constructive role in the Gaza Strip, it could re-emerge as an indispensable and useful partner for the United States and Europe.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications represent only the views of the individual authors.
