The latest period of tension between Russia and Turkey appears to be over. It was only a few months ago that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was testing Moscow’s red lines with friendly overtures to Ukraine. Now, Moscow and Ankara are responding to Middle East wars in exactly the same way: by using them as a stick to beat Israel and its Western backers.
Finding themselves on the same side of the barricades, Moscow and Ankara are likely to seek to align positions on thorny regional issues and strengthen ties, but that doesn’t mean each won’t accuse the other of stabbing them in the back.
Erdogan made several decisions this summer that will likely antagonize the Kremlin. During Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to Istanbul in July, the Turkish leader said Ukraine “deserves” to join NATO. Erdogan also handed over to Kiev the five commanders of the Ukrainian Azov Regiment, who were in Turkey under the terms of the Russia-Ukraine prisoner swap.
At the time, the Kremlin was distracted by the onset of the Ukrainian counter-offensive and the revolt by the Wagner mercenary group and had to content itself with verbal opposition formally made by senior officials. Russia’s only serious response was to withdraw from the Black Sea Grain Agreement, despite Turkish efforts to negotiate an extension, including the personal intervention of President Erdogan.
Ankara understood that Moscow was in a weak position, but Erdogan was merely testing Moscow’s red lines. He was not seeking to radically worsen bilateral relations. Erdogan agreed to travel to the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi on September 4 to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin, even though his original plans did not materialize. plan The trip was for Putin to Turkey. Despite hopes, the meeting did not revive the grain agreement or produce any real significant results. Its main achievement was to show the world that relations between Moscow and Ankara were on good terms.
Economic data is a vivid testament to the friendly relations between the two countries: trade between Russia and Turkey is set to grow by more than 80 percent to $62 billion in 2022, making Russia Turkey’s largest source of imports. This year’s figure is expected to be even higher.
However, foreign policy remains a constant challenge due to persistent disagreements over Syria, Libya, and the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh in the South Caucasus. Still, Russia and Turkey have avoided open conflict in recent years. Currently, the conflict between Israel and Palestine is intensifying, and both countries are on the same side. This is something not seen on other major international issues, and many expect relations between the two countries to improve rapidly.
According to a Kremlin reading of the Oct. 24 telephone conversation between President Erdoğan and President Putin regarding the Israel-Hamas war, Moscow and Ankara “have de facto overlapping positions and are in agreement with the well-known dichotomy that provides for the creation of a state system.” “We are focused on implementing national solutions.” An independent Palestine coexists peacefully and securely with Israel. ”
Although their stances are similar, their motivations are very different. When Russia’s UN representative Vasily Nebenzia said that Israel, as an occupying power, has no right to defend its own territory, he was trying to portray Russia as one of the leaders of the so-called Global South. In contrast, Erdogan wants to lead the Islamic world.
Russia’s open support for Hamas is a relatively recent phenomenon, a direct result of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Specifically, the invasion cooled relations with Israel and warmed relations with Iran, Hamas’ main sponsor. The appearance of a Hamas delegation in Moscow before the October 7 attack on Israel may have been interpreted as Russia trying to mediate between Palestinian factions. But now such contacts are viewed very differently by Israel. The alliance with Iran is secure, but Russia is indifferent.
Meanwhile, President Erdogan has long supported Hamas, allowing Hamas fighters to reside in Turkey and giving them Turkish passports. The Turkish president himself comes from Islamist circles, and supporting Hamas is ideologically important to him. In the first days of the current war, Erdoğan tried to move back and forth between Israel and Hamas (according to some reports, Erdoğan was also said to have expelled Hamas’ leadership from Istanbul). However, he soon abandoned that tactic and decided to fully support his Palestinian “brethren.”
Different paths have led Moscow and Ankara to the same decision to sacrifice ties with Tel Aviv, which means neither can act as a mediator in the current conflict. Turkey’s recent proposal to set up a guarantor group to facilitate a settlement of the fighting seems unfeasible. Even Moscow has been hesitant about the idea.
At the same time, neither country’s interactions with Hamas have been particularly effective. Despite being in contact with Hamas’s political leadership, neither Russia nor Turkey has released the hostages. This contrasts with the more successful efforts of, for example, Egypt and Qatar, which have liaised with the Hamas military wing in the Gaza Strip. However, Russia and Turkey’s approach allows for repeated criticism of the West, which is important to domestic audiences.
By accusing the United States of fomenting chaos in the Middle East, President Putin is reinforcing his claim that the West is the source of all misfortune in Russia and the world. Similarly, President Erdoğan’s criticism of the West for trying to start a war between Christianity and Islam appeals to strong anti-NATO sentiment in Turkey.
Still, these statements by President Erdoğan do not mean that he wants to destroy relations with NATO. In fact, it’s not. It is no coincidence that just two days after delivering his angry speech in support of Hamas, President Erdoğan introduced a bill in parliament recognizing Sweden’s membership in the Western military alliance. Turkey has so far resisted this.
It is therefore unlikely that the Kremlin will be able to recruit Turkey into its anti-Western campaign on behalf of the Global South. If Erdogan needs to demonstrate his loyalty to NATO member states (as Sweden did with its membership vote), he will do so without looking over his shoulder at Moscow.
An agreement on the Israeli-Hamas conflict would mean greater diplomatic cooperation between Russia and Turkey over, for example, the South Caucasus and Syria, but the improvement in relations is contingent and there are no guarantees against future conflict.
