At a summit in Madrid this week, NATO allies formally invited Finland and Sweden to join, the latest step in a dizzying process that was sparked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and delayed by Turkey, which has the second-largest military among NATO members after the United States, arguing that the Nordic countries had not adequately addressed its national security concerns. After weeks of tough negotiations, Turkey, Finland and Sweden agreed to the landmark tripartite declaration on Tuesday.
Turkey’s Atlantic Council sought expert opinion on the meaning of the summit and the tripartite declaration.
Jump to expert reaction
Mehmet Fatih Ceylan: Victory of NATO unity and solidarity
Ian Brzezinski: President Erdoğan recognizes that NATO brings far more geopolitical value than Russia
Rich Outzen: Summit brings Türkiye’s security concerns to the forefront
A victory for NATO unity and unity
The ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine since 2014 has completely changed the security environment not only in the Euro-Atlantic region but globally. It has fundamentally altered the threat perception beyond the alliance, leading Finland and Sweden to formally apply for NATO membership. These two countries have crossed the Rubicon and abandoned their neutrality in response to Russia’s relentless belligerence in the heart of Europe. Their decision to join forces and combine their efforts and assets to counter Russian aggression is natural and justified. Therefore, it is necessary to include Finland and Sweden in the alliance family.
The Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding signed between Turkey, Finland and Sweden on June 28 is a welcome development that demonstrates NATO’s unity and cohesion and aims to further strengthen the Alliance.
In NATO, when conflicts arise between allies or potential allies, it is the norm for them to consult and negotiate to find common ground. That is NATO’s role, and ultimately solutions that take into account those concerns are found by consensus.
It is also true that when new member states join NATO, they are bound by previous decisions made by the Alliance on various topics. NATO has a set of solid decisions and practices in the fight against terrorism, starting with the intervention in Afghanistan. Therefore, there are already agreements in NATO that contain all kinds of conceptual work and practices in different geographical theaters on the fight against terrorism, drawn up within NATO and binding on all member states.
The newly adopted Strategic Concept (SC) explicitly identifies Russia and “terrorism in all its forms and manifestations” as the primary source of threat in a 360-degree manner across all three of NATO’s core missions: collective deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. Given that terrorism, as defined in the SC, is the “most direct asymmetric threat to national security and international peace and prosperity,” it makes sense for both Finland and Sweden to work with Turkey as one of the primary counter-terrorism sources of threat to alliance interests.
In short, collective deterrence and defense against actual and potential adversaries, deterring crises in the bud, and expanding our network of partners in difficult situations will be NATO’s main tasks over the next decade.
NATO’s main center of gravity is the unity, unity and cohesion of NATO, including all allies and prospective allies.
Overall, the summit’s decisions will help NATO weather a difficult situation in the long term.
– Mehmet Fatih Ceylan is director of the Ankara Policy Center and former permanent representative of Turkey to NATO.
President Erdoğan recognizes that NATO offers far greater geopolitical value than Russia
NATO leaders at their summit in Madrid decided to “agree to invite Finland and Sweden to join NATO and to sign the Accession Protocol,” a significant development. Previously, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had suspended the protocol because the two Nordic countries had banned defense sales to Turkey and refused to extradite suspected Kurdish terrorists.
The agreement was facilitated by a meeting between US President Joe Biden and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan – a long-awaited bilateral meeting by the Turkish leader – and marked by a trilateral memorandum of understanding between Turkey, Sweden and Finland. Among them, Turkey and Finland will lift the trade embargo, condemn the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a terrorist organization, “address” Turkey’s pending extradition request, and support the European Union’s defense initiative. They agreed to support Turkey’s involvement.
This breakthrough underscores America’s influence and leadership in NATO. President Erdoğan’s decision to overturn his veto cannot be attributed solely to pressure from Europe. It also reflects Erdoğan’s recognition that NATO has far greater geopolitical value for Turkey than for Russia, which would be happy if the Nordic countries’ bids to join NATO fail.
The agreement to the Finnish-Swedish application also demonstrated alliance unity in the face of Russian aggression and the difficulties Russia still has in fully alienating Erdogan from the transatlantic community.Once again, Putin’s strongest relationship in the Black Sea region has proven to be much more transactional than strategic.
That being said, Turkey, like all other NATO allies, still needs to ratify these accession protocols. There is still ample opportunity for President Erdogan to bring in additional negotiations with NATO allies. I am optimistic that Sweden and Finland will become NATO members, but it is too early to say that this expansion is done.
—Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategic and Security and a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy.
Summit highlights Türkiye’s security concerns
The summit was a huge success for Ankara for three clear reasons. First, there is the content of the trilateral memorandum signed with Sweden and Finland. No arms embargo on Turkey, no commitment to address Turkish security concerns, no support for the PKK or (key) Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), no Gülen movement cited as a terrorism concern, no commitment to address Turkey’s security concerns, no support for the Gülen movement mentioned as a terrorism concern, no commitment to address Turkey’s security concerns I don’t know what they missed, such as cooperation, future working groups, etc. Of course, these are statements of principles, and implementation and ultimate promise will emerge over time. But the same is true for Ankara’s approval of membership, as well as for specific cooperation.
The second reason is the White House’s enthusiastic support not only for the tripartite MOU but also for its commitment to ask Congress to approve the strengthening of Turkey’s air power, especially the sale and upgrade of F-16 fighter jets. Notable is that Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) has already strongly supported the agreement. The face-to-face meeting between President Biden and President Erdogan was also notable.
The third reason is more subtle: the inclusion of language in the slimmed-down new Strategic Concept on counterterrorism “in all its forms and manifestations.” This language, and its prominent consideration of both terrorism concerns and the Russian military threat, addresses Turkey’s concerns and highlights the value Turkey adds to the alliance.
—Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and adjunct senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey, and a 32-year veteran of the U.S. government, both military and civilian.
The views expressed on TURKEYSource are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.
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