The recent period of tension between Russia and Türkiye appears to be over. It was only a few months ago that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was testing Moscow’s red lines by making friendly overtures to Ukraine. Currently, both the Russian and Turkish governments are responding to Middle East wars in exactly the same way. In other words, it uses war as a crutch to defeat Israel and its Western supporters.
Finding themselves on the same side of the barricade, Moscow and Ankara are likely to seek to align positions on thorny regional issues and strengthen ties. But that doesn’t mean one side can’t be accused of stabbing the other in the back.
President Erdoğan made several decisions this summer that the Kremlin would be hostile to. During Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s visit to Istanbul in July, the Turkish leader said Ukraine “deserves” NATO membership. In addition, President Erdoğan handed over to Kiev five commanders of the Ukrainian Azov Regiment who were staying in Turkey under the terms of a Russian-Ukrainian prisoner exchange.
At that moment, the Kremlin was preoccupied with the launch of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and the revolt by the Wagner mercenary group, and had to settle for formal verbal objections from senior officials. Russia’s only serious response was to withdraw from the Black Sea grain agreement, despite Turkey’s efforts to negotiate an extension, including personal intervention from President Erdoğan.
The Turkish government understood that Moscow was in a vulnerable position, but Erdogan was simply testing Moscow’s red line. He was not trying to fundamentally deteriorate bilateral relations. Despite his original plans, President Erdogan agreed to travel to Russia’s Black Sea resort of Sochi on September 4 to meet President Vladimir Putin. plan It was because President Putin was going to Türkiye. Despite expectations, the talks did not revive the grain agreement or actually yield any significant results. The main result was to let the world know that relations between Moscow and Ankara were in good condition.
Economic data provides vivid evidence of friendship. Trade between Russia and Turkey will increase by more than 80% to $62 billion in 2022, making Russia the largest source of imports for Turkey. This year’s numbers are expected to be even higher.
But foreign policy remains at a standstill, with deep differences over Syria, Libya and the disputed South Caucasus region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Still, Russia and Turkey have managed to avoid open conflict in recent years. Now, with the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both countries find themselves on the same footing. This has never happened on any other major international issue, and many predict that relations between the two countries will quickly warm up.
According to a Kremlin reading of the Oct. 24 telephone conversation between President Erdoğan and President Putin regarding the Israel-Hamas war, Moscow and Ankara “have de facto overlapping positions and are in agreement with the well-known dichotomy that provides for the creation of a state system.” “We are focused on implementing national solutions.” An independent Palestine coexists peacefully and securely with Israel. ”
Although their stances may be similar, their motivations are very different. When Russia’s UN representative Vasily Nebenzha says that Israel, as an occupying power, has no right to defend itself, he is trying to paint Russia as one of the leaders of the so-called Global South. In contrast, President Erdogan wants to lead the Islamic world.
Russia’s open support for Hamas is a relatively recent phenomenon, a direct result of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Specifically, the invasion cooled relations with Israel and warmed relations with Iran, Hamas’ main sponsor. The appearance of a Hamas delegation in Moscow before the October 7 attack on Israel may have been interpreted as Russia trying to mediate between Palestinian factions. But now such contacts are viewed very differently by Israel. The alliance with Iran is secure, but Russia is indifferent.
Meanwhile, President Erdogan has long supported Hamas, allowing Hamas fighters to reside in Turkey and giving them Turkish passports. The Turkish president himself comes from Islamist circles, and supporting Hamas is ideologically important to him. In the first days of the current war, Erdoğan tried to move back and forth between Israel and Hamas (according to some reports, Erdoğan was also said to have expelled Hamas’ leadership from Istanbul). However, he soon abandoned that tactic and decided to fully support his Palestinian “brothers.”
Through different paths, Moscow and Ankara came to the same decision to sacrifice relations with Tel Aviv, which means that neither can become a mediator in the current conflict. Turkey’s recent proposal to establish a guarantor group to facilitate a resolution to the fighting appears unfeasible. Even Moscow was reluctant to the idea.
At the same time, neither country’s interactions with Hamas have been particularly effective. Despite coordinating with the organization’s political leadership, both Russia and Turkey have not been able to free the hostages. This contrasts with the more successful efforts of, for example, Egypt and Qatar, which have contacts with Hamas’ military wing in the Gaza Strip. Nevertheless, their approach has allowed Russia and Turkey to level repeated criticisms of the West, which is important for domestic audiences.
By accusing the United States of stirring up chaos in the Middle East, President Putin is reinforcing his claim that the West is the root of all misfortune in Russia and the wider world. Similarly, President Erdoğan’s criticism of Western countries seeking to start a war between Christians and Muslims appeals to strong anti-NATO sentiment within Turkey.
Still, this kind of rhetoric from President Erdoğan does not mean that he wants to destroy relations with NATO, far from it. Just two days before giving an angry speech in support of Hamas, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan submitted a bill to parliament that would approve Sweden’s membership in the Western military alliance, a bill that Turkey had previously resisted. It wasn’t a coincidence.
Therefore, it is unlikely that the Kremlin will be able to recruit Turkey to an anti-Western campaign on behalf of the Global South. If President Erdoğan needs to show loyalty to NATO members (as he did with Sweden’s membership vote), he will do so without looking back at Moscow.
An agreement on the conflict between Israel and Hamas means greater diplomatic cooperation between Russia and Turkey, for example over the South Caucasus and Syria. However, the warming of relations is situational and there is no guarantee against future conflicts.
