Turkey’s role in the alliance will be high on the agenda at the upcoming NATO summit in Washington, DC, given Turkey’s continued interest in diversifying its international partnerships outside of the West. The summit will be an opportunity for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to reiterate his commitment to the alliance and reassure NATO allies that Turkey’s friendly relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Turkey’s interest in joining BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Sweden’s delayed NATO membership are not cause for concern about Turkey’s role in NATO.
A nuanced understanding of Turkey’s motivations behind the so-called pivot shift, particularly its efforts to diversify its strategic and economic partnerships beyond the West and NATO, can help allay some of these concerns. While we acknowledge that some of Ankara’s decisions, such as the S-400 crisis, are deeply problematic, NATO would be better off engaging Turkey than alienating it, thus preserving an ally with influence beyond its historical borders in the West.
Türkiye as a mid-level power
It is well known that Turkey’s balancing act with a diverse and sometimes competing set of countries is not a recent phenomenon but a continuation of long-established policies, such as its membership in the European Union and pursuit of closer ties with the West, as well as its engagement with cultural organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
This dual strategy is central to Turkey’s complex yet advantageous approach to international relations and remains relevant in the current context of an increasingly multi-layered world, with new intra- and inter-regional partnerships emerging as key actors in trade, security and governance.
Turkey’s interest in joining BRICS and President Vladimir Putin’s support for it have attracted attention recently and sparked backlash as Turkey would be the first NATO member state to join the organization, but Erdogan had already expressed interest in joining BRICS in 2018 during Turkey’s first high-level contact with the organization at the 10th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa.
It is worth noting that Turkish-Russian relations are characterized by a complex interplay featuring both cooperation and conflict in a proxy war.
While diversifying international partnerships does not mean Turkey will leave NATO, Turkey’s erroneous decision to purchase the Russian S-400 missile defense system was a major violation of NATO protocols and caused a major rift within the alliance, leading to discussions of a possible Turkish withdrawal. The decision not only raised security concerns due to the system’s incompatibility with NATO defenses, but also signaled concerns about closer ties with Russia. It is worth noting that Turkish-Russian relations are characterized by a complex interplay featuring both cooperation and conflict in proxy wars.
Economic interests are equally important, especially given Turkey’s economic challenges and high energy dependency on neighboring countries such as Russia, which supplies around 50% of Turkey’s natural gas needs. Turkey has also allegedly helped Russia evade international sanctions, further complicating diplomatic relations. Thus, a balanced Turkish foreign policy is more of a necessity than a choice, given the country’s economic vulnerability and strategic geographic location amid multiple conflicts from Ukraine and the South Caucasus to the Eastern Mediterranean, Gaza and the Balkans.
However, Turkey’s membership in NATO and customs agreements with the EU have fostered strong economic and security ties with the West, providing Turkey with a strategic tool to use in its negotiations with BRICS and global southern countries, strengthening its position on the international stage.
Turkey may lack global influence compared to the big powers, but it sees itself as a key player in international affairs. Whether it is hosting talks between Somalia and Ethiopia or signing a grain deal between Russia and Ukraine, Turkey seeks to strengthen its influence and engagement in the regional, economic, diplomatic and security spheres. By positioning itself as a diplomatic bridge capable of negotiating with any international organization, Turkey aims to become an indispensable middle power on the world stage. This strategic approach seeks to enhance its regional leadership and global status, reflecting its ambition to be recognized as a key diplomatic actor.
To be sure, Erdogan’s aggressive “neo-Ottoman” foreign policy has often gone too far, as in the case of Syria. This approach has caused serious and ongoing problems, straining relations with Syria, the UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, leading to a series of policy reversals and rapprochement.
Türkiye-China relations
Turkey’s foreign policy, which has focused on strengthening ties with China as well as Middle Eastern countries such as Russia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has sometimes been viewed with skepticism by NATO allies, but this approach can be seen as a strategic necessity rather than a rejection of alliances.
Against this backdrop, relations between Turkey and China have been improving slowly but cautiously, according to Diren Dogan, a visiting lecturer at Oxford University. Diren believes there are several reasons for this growing interest and willingness to cooperate: “The most important one is the changing situation and the US strategy towards China. “The war in Ukraine has highlighted the importance of safe trade routes, while US pressure on the West over China’s rise has led China to look for alternative partners.” As a result, China has shown cautious interest in various sectors within Turkey, suggesting avenues for cooperation. However, Dogan stressed that “given the chronic distrust between the two countries, the future of Turkey-China relations seems to depend on whether this trust issue can be overcome.”
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited China in June to discuss cooperation in tourism, trade and energy. Turkey seeks a balanced trade relationship between the two countries and a diplomatic mediation role. Burak Yildirim, a security analyst at Istanbul-based think tank Khalij, believes the visit also allowed the two countries to continue to address the Uighur issue. “China may need Turkey’s support to counter international pressure over alleged human rights violations against Uighur Turks. It can be said that Hakan Fidan’s visit to Xinjiang was also aimed at addressing this issue,” Yildirim said.
During the visit, Turkey proposed cooperation in the field of nuclear energy and evaluated opportunities in the field of precious metals and minerals. Last year, notable progress was made in negotiations between Turkey and China regarding a third nuclear power plant, and further progress is expected with the possible visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Turkey.
The Chinese side is willing to cooperate in critical infrastructure, communications, 5G, and defense industries. However, Turkey, a NATO member, remains cautious in these areas, Yıldırım argues. This points to an underlying distrust and a recognition that there is still a long way to go for a significant partnership. Turkey’s participation in both the SCO and BRICS is significant, as they are both international frameworks that call for a fundamental rethinking of the post-World War II international order. Besides economic benefits, Çagdas Ünăngol, a professor of international relations at Marmara University in Istanbul, suggests that having close ties with Turkey provides China with public relations opportunities. This signals to both the Global South and the West that NATO allies have an interest in both BRICS and the SCO. Angol added that “Turkey’s so-called ‘pivot shift’ has PR value for Beijing beyond economic practicality.”
As Turkey’s economic crisis deepens, it has become more dependent on external funding for job creation and debt financing. Yildirim believes that “unlike Western countries, which for political reasons are less inclined to provide Turkey with the economic support it needs, the oil-rich BRICS countries are better able to allocate such resources.”
Revitalizing U.S.-Turkish relations
Turkey’s consistent involvement with NATO makes it unlikely that Turkey’s actions would mean a departure from the Western alliance, even in an increasingly multi-layered world. Turkey’s engagement with non-NATO countries creates opportunities to promote dialogue, trade, and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Historically, Turkey has favored a balanced geopolitical strategy, a fact acknowledged by the Turkish government and most Turkish citizens. The shift away from a unipolar world has forced governments to reassess their foreign policies, and Turkey is no exception.
Turkey is seeking to play a role on different platforms by diversifying multilateral mechanisms without spooking its traditional allies, including NATO. Turkey’s growing interest in BRICS, SCO and other global southern partnerships should be seen as part of this strategy, not a pivot. NATO would benefit from the involvement of its allies in these circles.
Understanding and working with Turkey’s perspective could strengthen Turkey’s relations with the United States and NATO, regardless of possible administrative changes in Ankara. A revitalized U.S.-Turkey partnership could contribute significantly to Black Sea security, particularly through collaboration with Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria. Economically, strengthened U.S.-Turkey relations could benefit the EU by encouraging investment in new trade routes.
NATO would benefit from engaging in a deeper dialogue with Turkey to understand the motivations behind its policies.
Recognizing Turkey’s strategic moves to expand its economic and geopolitical alliances beyond the West and NATO is crucial in addressing NATO’s concerns. Turkey’s pursuit of diverse partnerships should not be mistaken for a pivot but a strategic diversification. NATO would benefit from engaging in a deeper dialogue with Turkey to understand the motivations behind its policies.
Despite criticism of certain actions by the Turkish government, NATO’s interests are better served by building a strong relationship with Turkey. This approach would take advantage of Turkey’s position of influence and strengthen the alliance’s reach and power beyond traditional Western borders.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not represent the official position of the Wilson Center.
