While the latest rift is more than just rhetoric, Ankara is unlikely to cut ties completely unless Israel blocks Ankara’s participation in the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.
On May 2, Turkey announced a total ban on import and export activities with Israel, and that the boycott would continue until “a permanent ceasefire and humanitarian assistance are secured in Gaza.” The measures follow a series of targeted trade restrictions issued on April 9. If implemented, these decisions could have far more significant practical consequences than Turkey’s previous wartime posture toward Israel. Trade between the two countries will reach $7 billion in 2023, making Turkey Israel’s fifth-largest exporter. Until now, Turkish leaders have maintained a delicate balance in their approach to Israel’s military operations against Hamas, harshly criticizing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government while generally avoiding concrete retaliatory measures that could inflict new damage on bilateral relations. The trade boycott signals a hardening of this policy, but why now? And will Turkey take further steps against Israel?
Months of message discipline
Turkey’s relationship with Israel is complex, especially regarding the Palestinian conflict. Recent rifts reflect these complexities. Relations broke down completely in 2010 when Turkey supported a naval flotilla breaking Israel’s blockade of Hamas-controlled Gaza, triggering a controversial military raid and an international diplomatic crisis. Soon after, Turkey began openly providing Hamas with significant diplomatic support and protection.
Relations were not fully restored until December 2022, when Israel and Turkey reinstated their ambassadors after more than a decade. By then, Ankara’s role in Israeli-Palestinian affairs had significantly diminished, and Turkish officials realized they needed to keep diplomatic channels open with Israel to maintain influence on key issues in the region. That is why Turkey was cautious about severing ties again for several months after the Gaza war broke out in October. Turkey is particularly keen to position itself as a player in the post-war Gaza situation.
This is not to say that they have remained silent about the conflict. Ankara has made many strong criticisms during different phases of the war, especially in the early stages of the crisis. But before this week, it had worded most of these statements in detail to blame and shame Netanyahu personally, rather than Israel as a whole. For example, on November 15, the Turkish Foreign Ministry accused Netanyahu of “entering a dark page of history with the oppression and massacre of the Palestinian people.” President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has also largely followed this line, as on November 29, when he called Netanyahu the “butcher of Gaza.” By adopting this approach, Ankara seemed to believe that Netanyahu would eventually be voted out of power, allowing Erdogan to safely work with his successor while ignoring its harsh wartime criticisms as the product of Netanyahu’s policies alone.
Erdogan’s domestic considerations also made him wary of alienating Turkey, a major regional actor, U.S. ally and economic powerhouse. The Turkish economy has been hit by high inflation in recent years, alienating the president’s supporters. Resource-poor Turkey relies on international investment flows for economic stability, and Erdogan launched a charm offensive to draw in global markets. This included courting key regional leaders such as President Biden and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
These efforts paid off. In April 2022, a Turkish court transferred a case targeting Prince Mohammed for his involvement in the murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi to a Saudi Arabian court. In response to this move, in March 2023, Saudi authorities transferred $5 billion to the Turkish central bank to aid the economy ahead of the country’s parliamentary and presidential elections. Erdogan also recognized that a complete break with Israel would upset Prince Mohammed, who has not abandoned his goal of normalizing diplomatic relations with Jerusalem despite the Gaza war.
Moreover, Erdogan sought to change the status quo with Washington, Israel’s main ally, for a variety of reasons related to national security, regional influence, and domestic politics. Most notably, when Sweden applied to join NATO in May 2022, Ankara initially blocked the application. Erdogan did not agree to Sweden’s membership until President Biden tentatively invited him to Washington to move Turkey’s stalled request to purchase F-16 fighter jets forward through Congress.
Why was the script changed?
Four new developments have brought Erdogan’s appeal offensive in recent weeks to an abrupt halt. First, the Biden administration has recently hesitated to set a timeframe for a White House visit due to disagreements over the outcome of the summit, such as a potential trade deal or improved public welcome for Erdogan in Washington. Second, while Ankara previously believed the Gaza conflict would end within a few months, it now appears to believe the crisis is becoming a never-ending conflict. Third, Ankara is concerned that Netanyahu will remain in the spotlight for longer than expected. Even if he loses the early elections, Turkish leaders believe he could stage a comeback in the ensuing general elections. Fourth, Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) suffered a major defeat in local elections on March 31.
The latter development is significant from a general political perspective, as AKP candidates lost mayoral elections in major cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, and the party fell to second place in national polls for the first time in 20 years. More worrying for Erdogan, and for Turkey-Israel relations, is the rise of the far-right New Welfare Party (YRP), which increased its vote share by nearly 7 percentage points in national polls, taking many of Erdogan’s weaker right-wing supporters and taking several major cities from the AKP. The YRP is vehemently anti-Israel, in addition to holding a range of misogynistic, anti-Semitic and anti-LGBTQ positions.
Turkish citizens are overwhelmingly on the Palestinian side and are yearning for political actors who will demand tougher policies towards Israel. After all, they only see the Gaza crisis in terms of Israeli military operations. Hamas violence is barely visible on Turkish TV screens, and many are unaware that Hamas is still holding nearly 120 Israelis hostage. Enter the YRP, which positions itself as a “fresher, truly political Islamist” version of Erdogan’s AKP and is ready to go even further on the offensive against Israel. Given the economic stagnation and Erdogan’s lack of substantive action on Gaza, more voters are calling for a “new AKP” and it seems likely they will switch to the YRP.
Ahead of the March 31 vote, a Turkish journalist Tweeted The Turkish government stated that “we support Palestine in words, but in practice we support Israel,” pointing to evidence that bilateral trade with Israel continues despite Ankara’s hardline stance. Turkey’s Revolutionary Guards (YRP) quickly seized on this dichotomy, portraying the AKP’s Israel policy, and President Erdogan himself, as a two-faced figure, a portrayal that continues to garner support among many right-wing voters.
What happens next?
Erdogan has been hardening his Israel policy since early April to prevent more voters from drifting to the YRP. Given the end of the short-lived diplomatic relationship with Biden and the growing perception in Turkey that Prime Minister Netanyahu will remain in Turkey for the foreseeable future, Erdogan will feel little pressure to change this policy. In fact, this means that Ankara will no longer feel the need to customize its criticism of the Gaza war. In fact, Turkey may consider further action beyond rhetoric. On May 1, shortly after news broke that Erdogan’s visit to Washington had been canceled, Turkey announced that it would join South Africa’s attempt to take Israel to the International Criminal Court for “committing genocide.”
Meanwhile, the trade ban alone could have an impact on the Israeli economy. For example, cement and other construction materials are major Turkish exports to Israel, so their prices could rise now that Israel has to find alternative sources of supply. The same goes for goods such as steel, iron and steel, and automobiles, which will see higher transportation costs if they have to procure from more distant markets.
However, one key dynamic remains unchanged and may limit retaliatory measures against Israel: Erdogan’s desire to play a role in Gaza “the next day.” In line with Turkey’s vision of becoming a regional power, Ankara is keen to participate in rebuilding the Gaza Strip, sorting out Palestinian politics, and mediating a long-term solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This suggests that Turkey will avoid a complete breakdown like in 2010 again. Even a trade boycott may prove to be porous. Turkey reportedly still supplies Azerbaijani oil to Israel, which is sent by pipeline from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan and from there to Israel. But a complete breakdown could come soon if Israel rejects a Turkish role in Gaza or if Israeli-Saudi talks break down.
Soner Çagaptay is the Beyer Family Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute and director of the institute’s Turkish Studies Program.
