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On the eve of Turkey’s elections, liberal commentators and analysts at home and abroad sensed a potential landmark. After two decades in power, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan appeared weakened. His image as a competent and stable leader had been eroded by years of economic dysfunction and a backlash against bad governance and corruption following a devastating earthquake that destroyed vast swathes of southern Turkey. Opinion polls showed opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroglu with a firm lead in the first round of the presidential election. Erdogan’s time seemed to be coming to an end.
The day after the vote, disappointment was palpable among opposition supporters. Far from falling behind Kilicdaroglu, Erdogan held a comfortable lead of about 5 percentage points and was on the verge of sealing victory with nearly 50 percent of the vote. But the two will face off in a runoff election on May 28, when most experts consider the incumbent’s return to power a fait accompli. Meanwhile, Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its allies maintained control of parliament.
Like Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Erdogan knows how to solidify his electoral advantage among voters over his years in office and how to use his considerable power and influence to do so. This was demonstrated in the 2015 and 2018 elections, when Erdogan demonized the opposition, stoking fears of the dire threat they would unleash, and weaponizing the deep-seated resentment of his devout, nationalist base against Turkey’s traditionally secular coastal elites.
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After the dust settled, international observers declared the vote to have been largely free and without major irregularities. But they pointed to the country’s semi-authoritarian background. “Continuing restrictions on fundamental freedoms of assembly, association and expression hindered the participation of some opposition politicians and political parties, civil society and independent media in the electoral process,” the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe-led committee assessed. “Nevertheless, the campaign itself was competitive and largely free for most candidates, but marked by intense polarization and marred by harsh rhetoric, instances of misuse of administrative resources, and pressure and intimidation suffered by one opposition party.”
Erdogan’s defeat would mean a victory for liberal democracies around the world
The closely contested election between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and challenger Kemal Kılıcdaroglu will go into a runoff election on May 15. (Video: Reuters)
The result showed how Erdogan can manipulate the Turkish system he rules. Before the election, his main political opponents were already in jail or under threat of prosecution in false cases. Erdogan has spent years lining up supporters in government institutions. Business allies have transformed once-independent media companies into pro-government outlets, creating an information space that is heavily favorable to him.
The left-wing, pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) has faced targeted attacks and legal battles for years. Both of its two main leaders are currently in prison, and many of its parliamentarians and city officials have been disqualified or are the subject of political criminal proceedings. HDP candidates have joined the Green Left party’s electoral rolls, but the party has also faced a government-backed pressure campaign and some of its candidates and supporters have been arrested.
Erdogan’s political path from mayor to Turkish dictator
“The elections were technically unfair but technically undoubtedly free,” wrote veteran Turkey reporter Amberin Zaman of Al-Monitor. “Erdogan has used the authoritarian regime put in place following the contentious 2018 referendum to emasculate the media, pack the judiciary and other key institutions with yes-men, and shape his own interests. His vast propaganda machine continues to peddle lies about the opposition. In April, Erdogan got 32 hours of airtime on state TV compared to Kilicdaroglu’s 32 minutes.”
“Erdogan also used other tactics in the weeks leading up to the vote, such as raising salaries for civil servants and offering free gas to households,” the colleagues reported from Istanbul. “While the president’s speeches received full coverage in the Turkish press, Foreign Minister Kilçdaroglu spread his message to the public, mainly through his Twitter account and in speeches recorded at his kitchen table on topics such as the economy.”
Aside from the volatile political situation, Erdogan could count on a loyal voter base: “His performance, contrary to the opinion polls, underscored the president’s enduring appeal and the resonance of his political proposals with a conservative, devout electorate with strong nationalist leanings,” the Financial Times noted.
Meanwhile, the six parties that coalesced around Kilicdaroglu may not be able to maintain that unity for long. They are a mix of secular, religious and nationalist factions, and their unity was a great achievement in itself and symbolized the broader opposition desire to end Erdogan’s rule. But if they sense failure, their own ideological divisions and political differences may surface.
All of this bodes well for Erdogan as he prepares for the runoff election. “First, because his coalition controls parliament, it will be easy for Erdogan to argue that a Kılıcdaroglu victory would lead to political stalemate,” wrote Howard Eisenstat, an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute. “Second, and perhaps more important, the results indicate growing nationalist sentiment. Both Kılıcdaroglu and Erdogan can make valid claims to this segment of the electorate, but Kılıcdaroglu’s success depends on the Kurdish vote. Without them he cannot win, but with the Kurds many nationalist voters will turn away from him.”
Erdogan’s challenger sends message from his kitchen
Erdogan has been walking this dangerous line in Turkish politics for years. Two decades ago, his government helped push through sweeping reforms that banned Kurdish-language education and repealed draconian laws that stifled Kurdish identity. But in recent years he has taken a more nationalistic line, scapegoating pro-Kurdish politicians as “terrorist” sympathizers and intensifying a bloody counterinsurgency against separatist groups in Turkey’s southeast.
During his election campaign, Erdogan also appealed to religious Turks’ fears of a return to an earlier era of militant secularism that the predecessor to Kilicdaroglu’s Republican People’s Party (CHP) had championed for decades. The threats and culture wars appeared to work in Turkey’s hinterlands, where Erdogan draws most of his support. The apparent wariness among some conservative voters that Kilicdaroglu is an Alevis, a mystical, universalist sect of Islam that has been persecuted in the Sunni-majority country in the past, also seemed to have played a factor.
Outside the main coastal cities, the capital Ankara and Kurdish-majority areas, the opposition left-right coalition “has failed in other parts of the country.” Tweeted by Sonar ChagaptaiIn these places, “Erdogan demonized the HDP’s support for Kilicdaroglu and his Alevis, splitting voters between the right and the left to benefit his own right-wing forces,” the senior fellow at the Washington Institute added.
Anger over shoddy Erdogan-era construction projects that collapsed after the February earthquake also had little impact on the election: “Economic mismanagement and endemic corruption were not as widely accepted as many (including me) thought.” MIT Professor Daron Acemoglu writes:“These were important in the metropolitan areas, but not in the areas where the AKP had built and exploited patronage networks.”
The lesson seems harsh: at this point in Turkish democracy, and perhaps in any democracy, identity politics trumps everything else.
